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INTRODUCTION
When the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010, the world was horrified. That horror grew exponentially in the following weeks as the gallon count of spilled oil ballooned. That something so devastating threatened the Gulf Coast and
the Mississippi River Delta, an area all too recently ravaged by Hurricane Katrina, ignited American indignation. Corporate irresponsibility, possibly even corporate malfeasance, threatened the economy and
the ecology of the still-recovering region. The world demanded answers.
Thousands of miles away, residents of a different delta—Nigeria’s
Niger Delta—have long since ceased to demand answers. For more
than half a century, oil spills totaling twice that of Deepwater Horizon
have become part of the status quo—the cost of doing business with
multinational oil companies. The difference in the Niger Delta is that
those who reap the benefits of that business, and those who bear its
costs, are wholly different parties.
The region’s massive oil reserves are, in some respects, a blessing, forming the bedrock of the Nigerian economy. Those reserves
have generated billions of dollars, and will continue to do so for the
foreseeable future.1 Those revenues have not trickled down, however.
Oil wealth has been diverted for decades into the bank accounts of
1

U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS: NIGERIA 2 (August 2011), http://www.eia.gov/cabs/Nigeria/pdf.pdf [hereinafter EIA COUNTRY
ANALYSIS BRIEF].
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political elites who reside miles away from the oil pipelines.2 For
Delta residents, the region’s vast oil reserves are a curse: black gold
that has poisoned the earth, the water, the air, and the people.
The catastrophic damage to the region is by no means a new
phenomenon. For fifty years, oil has spilled into the watershed—and
the clean-up efforts by Shell, Chevron, and Exxon have been nominal
at best. Disregard for damage to people and property that would be
unthinkable in the United States is standard operating procedure in the
Niger Delta. Because the Nigerian government has historically been
both unwilling and unable to regulate the operations of its foreign
partners, members of the local population have resorted to violence to
voice their grievances.
The status quo cannot continue. Years of persistent cyclical conflict have entrenched opposing parties in their positions, and each side
is responsible for enough of the blame for the region’s degradation
that neither side has been held liable. Reliance on the parties involved
to negotiate a solution risks further environmental and human health
damage to a region that should have to tolerate no more. Given these
stark realities, this Note advocates for a solution that has not yet been
tried: pursuit of common law tort claims by Nigerian citizens against
American-owned oil companies in American courts. This Note aims
to leverage increasing expectations of corporations as global citizens
into legal action on behalf of victims of oil spills in the developing
world. In so doing, this Note may thereby elucidate a potential,
peaceful method of recovery for previously-marginalized populations.
Part I of this Note details the human health effects of oil spills,
particularly the chemical toxicity of crude oil, and the dangerous illnesses that can result from severe, prolonged exposure. Part II presents the circumstances and impact of the two worst oil spills affecting the United States. in recent history—Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon—to directly contrast with Part III’s discussion of the
impact of oil spills in Nigeria. Part IV examines the three major litigation options for Nigerian plaintiffs: (1) domestic suits in Nigerian
courts, (2) Alien Tort Claims in U.S. federal courts, and (3) common
law tort claims in U.S. federal courts. Part IV advocates for the third
option—the use of common law tort claims—as the road to recovery.
It concludes by presenting the prima facie elements of a potential tort
action by Nigerian plaintiffs against a U.S.-based multinational oil
company.

2

See infra Part III.B.1.
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HUMAN HEALTH EFFECTS OF OIL SPILLS

Studies documenting the impact of exposure to crude oil are numerous and consistent in their findings: the toxic substances in crude
oil and the waste products generated by oil extraction are hazardous to
human health.3 The amount of attention paid to such findings varies
by country, with the level of interest generally bearing an inverse relationship to how developed the country is.4 Whereas wealthy, developed nations like the United States have the resources and the institutional capacity to mitigate and manage severe ecological catastrophes
like the Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon oil spills, poorer, lessdeveloped nations like Ecuador and Nigeria are much less capable.
As a result, the human health impact of oil spills in these countries is
understandably greater.
A.

The Chemical Toxicity of Crude Oil

Crude oil, a naturally-occurring substance that is refined into
commercially usable energy sources, is a complex, variable mixture of
organic compounds.5 Though its composition varies across geographic sources, the primary organic compounds in crude oil are hydrocarbons, which chemically bond together and with other chemical molecules.6 The refining process and release of crude oil into the environment, where it can combine and interact with other naturally occurring substances, further modify crude oil’s chemical composition.7
Some of the most dangerous organic compounds typically found
in crude oil are benzene, toluene, and naphthalene.8 Benzene, a proven carcinogen which primarily enters the body through respiratory
inhalation, is known to cause leukemia.9 As early as 1948, the Amer3

For thorough tables detailing the health studies conducted after oil spills,
see Bernard D. Goldstein et al., The Gulf Oil Spill, 364 N. ENG. J. MED. 1334, 1336–
38, 1340–43 (2011).
4
Compare Part II, with Part III.
5
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES
& DISEASE REGISTRY, TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR TOTAL PETROLEUM
HYDROCARBONS
1
(Sept.
1999),
available
at
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp123.pdf
[hereinafter
TOXICOLOGICAL
PROFILE].
6
Id. at 18.
7
Id. at 19.
8
Gina M. Solomon & Sarah Janssen, Health Effects of the Gulf Oil Spill,
304 JAMA 1118, 1118 (2010)
9
TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE, supra note 5, at 5. In 1987, the World Health
Organization’s International Agency for Research on Cancer classified benzene as a
Group 1, or proven, carcinogen. See INT’L AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER,
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ican Petroleum Institute stated that “the only absolutely safe concentration of benzene is zero.”10 Both toluene and naphthalene are classified as “reasonably anticipated to cause cancer in humans” by the
National Toxicology Program of the Department of Health and Human Services.11 Respiratory exposure to toluene can cause fatigue,
headache, and nausea, and long-term exposure can permanently damage the central nervous system.12 Exposure to naphthalene can damage or destroy red blood cells, and cause hemolytic anemia.13 Benzene, toluene and naphthalene can all contaminate water and food
sources, and can enter the body through ingestion of either.14
Crude oil also contains polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons
(PAHs).15 Also classified as “[r]easonably anticipated to be human
carcinogens,” PAHs are released into the atmosphere in many ways,
such as during the combustion of coal and wood, or through industrial
emissions.16 Once released, PAH compounds can be inhaled or contaminate food and groundwater sources.17 Exposure to PAHs has
been linked to bladder, skin, and lung cancers.18 Though the majority
of toxic PAH exposure is via respiratory inhalation of toxins in the
ambient air,19 contact with crude oil containing high concentrations of
PAHs can lead to absorption through the skin.20 Studies have shown

WORLD HEALTH ORG., IARC MONOGRAPHS ON THE EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC
RISKS
TO
HUMANS,
4,
120
(Supp.
7,
1987),
available
at
http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Monographs/suppl7/Suppl7.pdf. Even low level exposure over a prolonged period can cause leukemia. R. Duarte-Davidson et al., Benzene in the Environment: An Assessment of the Potential Risks to the Health of the
Population, 58 OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 2, 12 (2001).
10
AM. PETROLEUM INST., API TOXICOLOGICAL REVIEW: BENZENE 4 (1948),
available at http://www.hobsonbradley.com/articles/pdf/pdffile.pdf.
11
NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., REPORT ON CARCINOGENS, 276, 414 (12th ed. 2011), available at
http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/roc/twelfth/roc12.pdf
[hereinafter
REPORT
ON
CARCINOGENS].
12
TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE, supra note 5, at 4.
13
AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, TOXFAQS FOR
NAPHTHALENE, 1-METHYLNAPTHALENE, 2-METHYLNAPTHALENE 1 (2005), available at
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts67.pdf.
14
Duarte-Davidson, supra note 9, at 4; TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE, supra note
5, at 3–4.
15
TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE, supra note 5, at 6.
16
REPORT ON CARCINOGENS, supra note 11, at 353, 358; Carl-Elis Bostrom et
al., Cancer Risk Assessment, Indicators and Guidelines for Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons in the Ambient Air, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 451, 451 (2002).
17
REPORT ON CARCINOGENS, supra note 11, at 358.
18
Bostrom, supra note 16, at 452.
19
Id. at 452–53.
20
REPORT ON CARCINOGENS, supra note 11, at 358–59.
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that skin contact with substances containing PAHs, like asphalt, oil, or
tar, can result in topical skin infections, rashes, and skin tumors.21
B.

The Acute and Long-Term Health Effects of Exposure to Crude Oil

The toxicity of crude oil varies according to its chemical composition and the duration and manner of an individual’s exposure to the
substance.22 Everyone is exposed to at least some of the compounds
in crude oil in small doses, at gas stations and in parking garages, but
symptoms generally do not present absent significant exposure.23
Prolonged exposure to large amounts of environmental toxins has a
greater adverse impact on human health.24 For instance, the dizziness
and fatigue caused by exposure to toluene will subside once exposure
ends.25 Continuous exposure can become toxic, however.26 Assessment of the symptoms and impact of exposure to the toxins in crude
oil is therefore best bifurcated into acute and long-term effects.
Acute symptoms related to short-term exposure to crude oil have
been documented in a number of groups, particularly clean-up workers employed after spills.27 In the past, workers and coastal residential
populations impacted by oil spills reported and/or sought medical
treatment for headaches, nausea, vomiting, dizziness, and respiratory
distress.28 These are the types of symptoms that would be expected in
21

Solomon & Janssen, supra note 8, at 1118; AGENCY FOR TOXIC
SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, POLYCYCLIC AROMATIC HYDROCARBONS (PAHS) 1
(Sept. 1996), http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts69.pdf.
22
TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE, supra note 5, at 4.
23
Id. at 3.
24
Through the process of bioaccumulation, organic contaminants can built
up in the environment, and can then be absorbed by, consumed by, or otherwise transferred to, living organisms. This absorption/consumption of contaminated substances
“can result in the consumer being exposed to high dosages of toxic chemicals.” D.
Mackay & A. Fraser, Bioaccumulation of Persistent Organic Chemicals: Mechanisms
and Models, 110 ENVTL. POLLUTION 375, 375 (2000).
25
TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE, supra note 5, at 4.
26
Mackay & Fraser, supra note 24, at 375.
27
MARGARET A. MCCOY & JUDITH A. SALERNO, ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF
THE GULF OF MEXICO OIL SPILL ON HUMAN HEALTH: A SUMMARY OF THE JUNE 2010
WORKSHOP
48–49
(2010),
available
at
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12949&page=R1. See also BRADLEY
S. KING & JOHN D. GIBBINS, NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUP. SAFETY & HEALTH, HEALTH
HAZARD EVALUATION OF DEEPWATER HORIZON RESPONSE WORKERS 2–3 (2011),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/hhe/reports/pdfs/2010-0115-0129-3138.pdf.
28
Solomon & Janssen, supra note 8, at 1118; Naveed Zafar Janjua et al.,
Acute Health Effects of the Tasman Spirit Oil Spill on Residents of Karachi, Pakistan,
6 BMC PUB. HEALTH 84, 84 (2006).
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persons exposed for short periods to toxic chemicals like benzene,
toluene, and naphthalene.29 While unpleasant, none of these symptoms are critical, and even minor symptoms can be prevented with
proper training and equipment.30 Use of gloves, coveralls, and safety
goggles, allowing workers to take rest breaks, and encouraging adequate hydration can minimize health problems during clean-up efforts.31 A study of individuals involved in the clean-up efforts following a tanker spill off the coast of Karachi, Pakistan also noted decreased lung function in workers.32 But the study, which included a
follow-up one year after the spill, noted that this impairment was reversible so long as exposure to crude oil ended.33
The symptoms associated with long-term exposure to crude oil are
much more serious. Paradoxically, far fewer studies document these
much more serious problems.34 While clean-up workers experience
acute effects that typically dissipate with time once they have left the
contaminated area, populations unfortunate enough to experience oil
spills close to their homes typically cannot leave, even if getting away
from the toxins is all it would take to avoid serious health consequences.35 Health problems become even more pronounced when oil
spills affect residential populations in developing countries.36
29
See Solomon & Janssen, supra note 8, at 1118; Ronan A. Lyons, et al.,
Acute Health Effects of the Sea Empress Oil Spill, 53 J. EPIDEMIOLOGICAL
COMMUNITY HEALTH 306, 306 (1999).
30
Solomon & Janssen, supra note 8, at 1119; Jose Miguel Carrasco et al.,
Association Between Health Information, Use of Protective Devices and Occurrence
of Acute Health Problems in the Prestige Oil Spill Clean-Up in Asturias and Cantabria (Spain): A Cross-Sectional Study, 6 BMC PUB. HEALTH 1, 2 (2006).
31
Bryan Walsh, Assessing the Health Effects of the Oil Spill, TIME, June 25,
2010, http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1999479,00.html.
32
Sultan Ayoub Meo, et al., Lung Function in Subjects Exposed to Crude Oil
Spill into Sea Water, 56 MARINE POLLUTION BULLETIN 88, 92 (2008). Karachi is the
largest city in Pakistan, with an estimated population of 13.125 million as of 2009.
CENT.
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY,
THE
WORLD
FACTBOOK:
PAKISTAN,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html (last updated Sept. 20, 2012). The dense population relative to the location of the oil spill is
pertinent in the context of the problem this note addresses.
33
Meo et al., supra note 32, at 92.
34
“‘While extensive data exists on the effects of oil spills on wildlife and
ecosystems, the effects on human health from these exposures have not been well
studied.’” Cal Woodward, Gulf Oil Spill Exposes Gaps in Public Health Knowledge,
182 CANADIAN MED. ASSOC. J 1290, 1290–91 (2010) (quoting Dr. Aubrey Miller,
Senior Medical Adviser to the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences
and the National Toxicology Program). MCCOY & SALERNO, supra note 26, at 52
(“[O]f the thousands of chemical structures in crude oil . . . only a very few of these
structures have been tested individually for their toxic potential.”)
35
Residents in the Ecuadorian Amazon have been gravely impacted by oil
extraction in the region. Increasing rates of cancer in the region’s native populations
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The overall damage done by oil spills in or near developed countries is not insignificant, but the relative magnitude of effect on a
country like the United States or United Kingdom is significantly less
than on a country like Ecuador or Nigeria. This relative difference is
illustrated by what is known about the health impact of oil spills more
generally. In the developed world, much of what is known about
acute effects is based on reports from clinics or other health facilities
that have treated symptomatic individuals.37 The majority of the information available about the health impact of exposure to crude oil is
therefore known about acute symptoms, because data collection predominately occurs in countries able to halt the detrimental effects at
the acute stage.38 In summer 2010, following the Gulf oil spill, the
Institute of Medicine convened a conference in New Orleans to discuss the potential human health impact of such occurrences.39 Attendees “expressed frustration that they know little about the health
risks of a substance that courses so ubiquitously through daily life.”40
Because long-term health effects associated with toxic crude oil exposure have not presented en masse in the United States, the opportunities for research and documentation have not presented either.
These realities have generated a gap in the available data regarding the human health consequences of oil spills. Minor symptoms are
best understood, while little is known about potentially fatal long-term
have been documented since the mid-1980s. See James Brooke, Pollution Of Water
Tied
to
Oil
In
Ecuador,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Mar.
22,
1994,
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/22/science/pollution-of-water-tied-to-oil-inecuador.html; Anna-Karin Hurtig & Miguel San Sebastian, Geographical Differences
in Cancer Incidence in the Amazon Basin of Ecuador in Relation to Residence Near
Oil Fields, 31 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1021, 1023 (2002); see infra Part IV.C.1 for
discussion of the litigation related to this pollution.
36
Meo et al., supra note 32, at 92; Hurtig & San Sebastian, supra note 35, at
1021–23.
37
See Solomon & Janssen, supra note 8, at 1118; Lyons et al., supra note 29,
at 309.
38
See, e.g., Stuart Fox, Gulf Spill Has Little Impact on Human Health,
MSNBC.COM (May 3, 2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36921960/ns/healthmore_health_news/. The author indicates that Americans need not be concerned
about exposure to oil from the Gulf Spill (discussed infra Part II.B), and categorically
states that “oil by itself cannot kill or seriously harm a human.” Fox, supra. However, other studies disprove this summary thesis, and instead indicate how much, we do
not know about the health effects of human exposure to crude oil. A 2010 research
review noted that although there have been thirty-eight major oil spills, only seven
were followed by subsequent studies of the effects on human health. Further, those
studies that were conducted looked primarily at acute and psychological symptoms.
Francisco Aguilera et al., Review on the Effects of Exposure to Spilled Oils on Human
Health, 30 J. APPLIED TOXICOLOGY 291, 298 (2010).
39
See generally MCCOY & SALERNO, supra note 27.
40
Woodward, supra note 34, at 1290.
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exposure to crude oil.41 Though a number of studies of oil-affected
populations have been conducted in developing states, data collectors
face significant problems.42 Researchers must often make concerted
efforts to seek out subjects for their studies. Reliance on reports from
medical facilities is impractical because treatment is often unavailable
for those affected by oil spills.43 Though something of a “chicken and
egg” problem, the majority of accurate public health data is typically
collected from a network of providers,44 but particularly in places
where resources are limited, it is difficult to provide adequate medical
services without understanding the scale of services needed.45 Data
regarding a particular localized health problem and treatment of that
health problem are inextricably linked. Without sufficient data to
demonstrate the severity of the problem, it is difficult to truly justify
the need for treatment.46 And without adequate treatment options,
individuals have few reasons to self-report. These types of practical,
societal problems further compound the public health impact of oil
spills.
II.

THE IMPACT OF OIL SPILLS ON THE UNITED STATES
A.

Exxon Valdez

In 1989, the Exxon Valdez supertanker ran aground on a reef off
the coast of Alaska, spilling 11 million gallons of crude oil into Prince
41
Walsh, supra note 31 (“As catastrophic as the Gulf oil spill has been for
the region’s environment and residents’ livelihoods, experts say the impact of the
disaster on human health and well-being has not even begun to be quantified.”).
42
Meo et al., supra note 32, at 92.
43
Id. Authors noted practical difficulties in obtaining results for their study,
including unwillingness of individuals to participate because they feared they would
be forced to retire if poor health was disclosed to their employers. Participants had to
be actively recruited, and assured that the study was actually for their individual benefit. See also Judith Kimerling, Indigenous Peoples and the Oil Frontier in Amazonia:
The Case of Ecuador, Chevrontexaco, and Aguinda v. Texaco, 38 N.Y.U. J. OF INT'L
L. & POL. 413, 466 (2006) (“These findings are likely just the tip of the iceberg because diagnostic services and health data are limited, especially in indigenous communities; exposures to toxic chemicals continue; and in cases of cancer, latency periods delay the onset of disease, and five to forty years can pass between the date of the
harmful exposures and the first appearance of symptoms of the disease.”).
44
See generally Division of Preparedness & Emerging Infections, CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ncpdcid/deiss/about.html
(last updated Apr. 1, 2011).
45
See generally Junaid A. Razzak & Arthur L. Kellermann, Emergency
Medical Care in Developing Countries: Is it Worthwhile?, 80 BULL. WORLD HEALTH
ORG. 900 (2002).
46
Id. at 904.
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William Sound.47 At the time, the spill was the largest in U.S. history,
and its remote location hampered clean-up efforts and exacerbated the
already-devastating magnitude of damage to the environment and the
economy.48 In the context of the problem that this note presents,
however, the remote location of the Exxon Valdez spill was, in some
ways, fortuitous. The spill is infamous for damaging the ecosystem,
which has still not recovered more than two decades later.49 But there
have been few, if any, physical health consequences attributed to the
spill.50 No major studies on the physical health impact of the spill
have been conducted.51
In addition to paying hundreds of millions of dollars in fines and
restitution,52 Exxon contributed $2.1 billion to clean-up efforts.53 The
Exxon Valdez Trustee Council and Public Advisory Committee—
comprised of state and federal experts on marine transportation, commercial fishing, environmental conservation, and other matters—were
formed.54 Two decades later, the Trustee Council continues to oversee restoration efforts and manages the $900 million of settlement
47

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 478 (2008).
Emergency Management: Exxon Valdez, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/learning/exxon.htm (last updated Jan. 27, 2011).
49
Doug Struck, Twenty Years Later, Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Linger,
YALE ENV’T 360 (Mar. 24, 2009), http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2133.
50
A number of studies have been conducted surveying the negative psychological impacts of the spill, and have noted general patterns of depression in the local
population. These mental health problems have been attributed in part to the economic consequences of the oil spill (e.g. stress over financial concerns due to the tremendous impact on the local fishing industry), and are considerably different than the
types of physical and epidemiological problems noted in other spills. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Palkinkas, et al., Community Patterns of Psychiatric Disorders After the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1517, 1517 (1993); see also Goldstein et al., supra note 3, at 1340–43.
51
Recently, though, in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, individuals involved in the Exxon Valdez clean-up have begun to come forward with health
complaints. Drew Griffin, Critics Call Exxon Valdez Clean-up A Warning for Gulf
Workers,
CNN
NEWS,
(July
8,
2010,
10:33
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/07/07/oil.spill.valdez.workers/index.html.
52
“More than a hundred law firms were involved in over two hundred suits,
involving more than thirty thousand claims. The total damage claims exceeded fifty
billion dollars. Although some of the claims were settled or dismissed, more than ten
thousand remained.” Daniel A. Farber, Tort Law in the Era of Climate Change,
Katrina and 9/11: Exploring Liability for Extraordinary Risks, 43 VAL. U. L. REV.
1075, 1102 (2009).
53
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 479 (2008).
54
EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL 2009 STATUS REPORT 7
(2009),
available
at
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/Universal/Documents/Publications/20th%20Anniversar
y%20Report/2009%20Status%20Report%20(Low-Res).pdf.
48
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funds allotted to repair the ecosystem.55 At the height of the clean-up
efforts, more than 11,000 people were participating, “ultimately becoming the largest private project in Alaska since construction of the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline.”56 Of course, the damage to the region’s ecosystem was tremendous, but short of undoing the spill itself, there is
little more that could have been done in terms of disaster relief efforts.
B.

Deepwater Horizon

The Exxon Valdez’s position as the worst oil spill in U.S. history
was overtaken on April 20, 2010, when the British Petroleum (BP)
offshore oil rig Deepwater Horizon exploded, killing eleven workers
and opening an oil gusher a mile below sea level on the ocean floor.57
Over the next eighty-six days, until the leak was capped on July 15,
205 million gallons of oil were released into the Gulf of Mexico.58
Though just how much damage the BP spill will eventually cause is
yet undetermined, what was undeniably remarkable was the scope and
rapidity of the clean-up efforts.59 By April 28, responders were ready
to execute an in situ burn: corralling the oil with fire-proof booms and
lighting it ablaze to burn off the petroleum before the oil becomes too
dispersed.60 Though this technique is not without its dangers, primarily via the inevitable release of toxins into the air,61 it is known to be
an effective technique for ridding a contained area of oil in a very
short period.62 In addition, before the end of May, BP established a

55

Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 5.
57
Jonathan Weisman et al., Spill Tops Valdez Disaster. WALL ST. J., May 28,
2010, at A1.
58
Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, Gulf Spill Is the Largest of Its
Kind, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at A14; Jeremy Repanich, The Deepwater Horizon Spill by the Numbers, POPULAR MECHANICS, (Aug. 10, 2010, 12:39
PM),
http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/coal-oil-gas/bp-oil-spill-statistics.
59
See
generally
Recovery
Plan,
RESTORETHEGULF.GOV,
http://www.restorethegulf.gov/task-force/recovery-plan (providing the US government’s official information on the response, assistance, health and safety, the environment and news) (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
56

60

TIMELINE – Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, REUTERS (June 3, 2010, 9:10 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/03/oil-spill-events-idUSN0322326220100603.
NIR
BARNEA, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ASS’N, HEALTH AND SAFETY ASPECTS OF IN-SITU
BURNING
OF
OIL
1
(last
visited
Aug.
24,
2012),
http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/sites/default/files/health-safety-ISB.pdf
61
BARNEA, supra note 60, at 2–6.
62

Id. at 1.
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tip hotline and email address for suggestions for clean-up methods.63
It received close to 100,000 tips and emails and reportedly seriously
looked into 700 of them.64 As of August 2010, the National Institutes
of Health had pledged $10 million to fund research on potential human health effects, and BP had pledged $500 million to fund research
on the environmental and public health impact of the spill.65 And as
of October 2010, the number of response workers involved in the Gulf
clean-up was more than 55,000.66 Movie director/producer James
Cameron offered BP the use of his private submarines,67 and actor
Kevin Costner offered the centrifugal oil separator technology he began inventing fifteen years ago after starring in the film Waterworld.68
As was true for the Exxon Valdez spill, the efforts of the best and the
brightest will never be able to completely undo the damage, but at
least some of the harm has been mitigated, and massive clean-up efforts are ongoing.69
III.

THE IMPACT OF OIL SPILLS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD –
NIGERIA

In the developing world, oil spills garner far less attention than
they do in the United States or Europe. Unfortunately, developing
states have other equally critical crises occurring simultaneously.
63
Matt Gutman & Jessica Hopper, The BP Bounce: Got an Oil Spill Idea for
BP? Don’t Hold Your Breath, ABC NEWS, (May 24, 2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/WN/bp-suggestion-box-overflowsinventions/story?id=10730071.
64
Id.
65
Anita Slomski, Experts Focus on Identifying, Mitigating Potential Health
Effects of Gulf Oil Leak, 304 JAMA 621, 624 (2010). In addition, “[m]ore than 300
staff from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Agency for
Toxic Substance and Disease Registry (ATSDR) are monitoring health threats from
the oil spill in five Gulf states through the National Poison Data System.” Id.
66
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health compiled a
voluntary roster of response workers. Deepwater Horizon Response – NIOSH Voluntary Roster of Deepwater Horizon Response Workers, NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUP.
SAFETY
&
HEALTH,
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/oilspillresponse/workerroster.html (last updated
Dec. 13, 2011).
67
James Quinn, Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill: James Cameron Offers Private
Submarines to Help BP Clean-Up, THE TELEGRAPH (U.K.), (May 13, 2010, 4:01 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/7719941/Gulf-ofMexico-oil-spill-James-Cameron-offers-private-submarines-to-help-BP-cleanup.html.
68
Louis Sahagun, Costner to Gulf’s Rescue?, LOS ANGELES TIMES, May 21,
2010, at AA1.
69
See supra note 59.
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Spill-related problems tend to lie dormant because the most serious
health damage done by oil spills only occurs when exposure is severe
and protracted, and that damage takes time to manifest. Even the
damage from a serious spill near a densely populated urban area like
Karachi, Pakistan, may be mitigated over time,70 so long as the spill is
an isolated event and not part of a pattern.71 In a number of countries,
however, severe oil spills have become regular occurrences, and the
serious health consequences caused by exposure to crude oil are presenting en masse. One such country is Nigeria.
A.

History of the Nigerian Oil Industry

The Niger Delta, located where the biggest river in West Africa
meets the Atlantic Ocean, is one of the largest wetlands in the world,72
covering approximately 27,000 square miles, and eleven states.73 The
terrain is made up of swamps, estuaries, and dense mangrove forests,
so much of the area is inaccessible by road,74 and “75% of the area . . .
is regularly flooded by water.”75 Despite its inaccessibility, the greater region is home to more than 30 million people from forty ethnic
groups.76 Annual population growth is estimated at three percent—
making the Delta one of the most densely populated areas in the
world.77 Oil was first discovered in the region in 1956, and commercial export began two years later.78 Due to its considerable reserves
(estimated at 37.2 million barrels as of January 2011) and high quality
product (the chemical composition of Nigerian oil is preferable for
gasoline because it requires less refining), Nigeria is now one of the
70

See THE WORLD FACTBOOK: PAKISTAN, supra note 32.
See Meo et al., supra note 32, at 92.
72
Ibibia Lucky Worika, Deprivation, Despoilation and Destitution: Whither
Environment and Human Rights in Nigeria’s Niger Delta? 8 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 1, 4 (2001).
73
John Ghazvinian, The Curse of Oil, VIRGINIA Q. REV. (2007), available at
http://www.vqronline.org/articles/2007/winter/ghazvinian-curse-of-oil/;
DUNCAN
CLARKE, CRUDE CONTINENT: THE STRUGGLE FOR AFRICA’S OIL PRIZE 89 (2008).
74
Paul S. Orogun, Resource Control, Revenue Allocation, and Petroleum
Politics in Nigeria: The Niger Delta Question, 75 GEOJOURNAL 459, 477 (2010).
75
FOSSIL FUELS, OIL COMPANIES, AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 57 (Tobias Haller et al. eds., 2007).
76
Orogun, supra note 74, at 460.
77
Id.
78
AMNESTY INT’L, NIGERIA: PETROLEUM, POLLUTION AND POVERTY IN THE
NIGER
DELTA
11
(2009),
available
at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR44/017/2009/en/e2415061-da5c-44f8a73c-a7a4766ee21d/afr440172009en.pdf [hereinafter PETROLEUM, POLLUTION &
POVERTY].
71
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world’s major oil exporters, and the largest in Africa.79 In 1999, there
were an estimated 150 oil fields and over 1400 oil wells in the Niger
Delta; today, the number of oil fields has more than quadrupled, to
606.80 The largest share of oil extracted from these wells, more than
40 percent, is exported to the United States.81 That amount also
makes Nigeria the fifth-largest exporter of oil to the United States.82
Nigeria’s economy is based heavily on its oil, which generates
over 95 percent of export revenue.83 According to the Nigerian Constitution, all natural resources are property of the federal government,
so those export revenues are payable to the state.84 The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) is the mechanism through
which the government maintains control over the oil industry; the
79

EIA COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEF, supra note 1, at 2. ‘Dejo Olowu, From
Defiance to Engagement: An Evaluation of Shell’s Approach to Conflict Resolution in
the Niger Delta, 10 AFR. J. CONFLICT RESOL. 75, 78 (2010).
80
Ana Godson et al., Environmental Risk Factors and Health Outcomes in
Selected Communities of the Niger Delta Area, Nigeria, 129 PERSP. PUB. HEALTH
183, 183–84 (2009) (citations omitted); Development of Nigeria’s Oil Industry,
NIGERIAN
NAT’L
PETROLEUM
CORP.,
http://www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPCBusiness/BusinessInformation/OilGasinNigeria/De
velopmentoftheIndustry.aspx (last visited Aug. 20, 2012).
81
EIA COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEF, supra note 1, at 4.
82
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Crude Oil and Total Petroleum Imports Top
15
Countries
(Nov.
29,
2011),
http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/company_level_imports/
current/import.html. The amount of oil the US imports from Nigeria significantly
impacts the broader trade balance between the countries. In 2008, 44 percent of U.S.
trade with the entire Sub-Saharan African region was with Nigeria. See VIVIAN C.
JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31772, U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT
RELATIONSHIP WITH SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE AFRICAN GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY
ACT
6–7
(July
24,
2009),
available
at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128835.pdf.
83
EIA COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEF, supra note 1, at 1.
84
CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), § 44 (3). In the 1960s, the amount of
oil revenue remitted to the Delta states was 50 percent, but that amount fell to 1.5
percent by the 1990s. Cyril Obi, Resource Control in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, 2
GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE 59, 60 (2007), available at http://siu.no/eng/Front-Page/Globalknowledge/Issues/No-2-2007/Resource-Control-in-Nigeria-s-Niger-Delta. In 1999,
following the democratic election of President Olusegun Obasanjo, oil remittances
increased to 13 percent. Id. However, this 13 percent was recently limited, as increasing amounts of oil are found offshore in the Gulf of Guinea, and representatives
from other Nigerian states argued that the 13 percent should therefore only apply to
revenues from onshore oil. AMNESTY INT’L, NIGERIA: TEN YEARS ON: INJUSTICE AND
VIOLENCE HAUNT THE OIL DELTA 32 (2005). Since independence in 1960, Nigeria’s
leaders have predominately been from the Northern states, which have virtually no
natural resources. The increasing wealth of Northern political elites has “engrained in
the Niger Delta crude oil producing populations the perception that the ‘Northerners’
are essentially exploiting, repressing, and dispossessing them of their resources and
revenues.” Orogun, supra note 74, at 467.
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majority of multinational corporations (MNCs) which operate in Nigeria do so through joint ventures with the NNPC.85 The three primary MNCs operating in the Niger Delta are Shell, ExxonMobil, and
Chevron. Of these, the latter two are headquartered in the United
States: ExxonMobil in Irving, Texas, and Chevron in San Ramon,
CA.86
B.

The Impact of Oil on Nigeria
1.

Resource Control and the Cost of Doing
Business

MNCs reap considerable benefits from doing business in countries where legal and regulatory infrastructures are underdeveloped.
Foreign investment is attractive to host countries because it generates
jobs and economic activity, and is likewise attractive to MNCs because host countries often “have no comprehensive system of corporate regulation or the systems are ineffective due to lack of resources
to enforce existing laws . . . .”87 Lower standards, both for workplace
safety and environmental management, drive up corporate profit margins and therefore attract greater financial investment.88 The practice
of developing states making their economies more attractive to overseas investors by tolerating increasingly dangerous business practices

85
Joint Venture Activities, Nigerian National Petroleum Group, NIGERIAN
NAT’L
PETROLEUM
CORP.,
http://www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPCBusiness/UpstreamVentures/JointVentureActivitie
s.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2011). For analysis of the NNPC, see CLARKE, supra note
73, at 103–14.
86
Business
Headquarters,
EXXON
MOBIL,
http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/contactus_contact_businessheadquarters.aspx
(last
visited
Oct.
24,
2011);
Global
Contacts,
CHEVRON,
http://www.chevron.com/contact/globalcontacts/ (last updated July 2011). Shell,
formally called Royal Dutch Shell, has its headquarters in the Netherlands, Contact
Us, SHELL, http://www.shell.com/home/content/footer/about_this_site/contact_us/
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
87
E.E. Daschbach, Where There’s a Will, There’s a Way: The Cause for a
Cure and Remedial Prescriptions for Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in Latin
American Plaintiffs’ Actions Against U.S. Multinationals, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM.
11, 24 (2007) (quoting Maxi Lyons, A Case Study in Multinational Corporate Accountability: Ecuador’s Indigenous Peoples Struggle for Redress, 32 DENV. J. INT’L
L. & POL’Y 701, 728 (2004)).
88
Malcolm J. Rogge, Towards Transnational Corporate Accountability in
the Global Economy: Challenging the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in In re:
Union Carbide, Alfaro, Sequihua, and Aguinda, 36 TEX. INT’L L.J. 299, 314–15
(2001).
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by foreign investors has been termed the “global race to the bottom.”89
The fear that foreign investment by oil companies is causing a race to
the bottom in terms of environmental standards is a very realistic one
in the Niger Delta.90
Though Nigeria is one of the world’s major oil exporters, and that
should ideally translate into significant government revenues used to
benefit the broader population, historically, that has not been the
case.91 Only twenty percent of the population owns sixty-five percent
of the wealth—while seventy percent of the population hovers around
or below the poverty line.92 The majority of Nigerian citizens live on
less than two dollars per day.93 According to the United Nations 2011
Human Development Index, a metric based on a number of development indicators including life expectancy, literacy rates, and individual purchasing power parity, Nigeria ranked 156 out of 187 countries.94

89

See id. Commentators have defined the “global race to the bottom” as “the
progressive movement of capital and technology from countries with relatively high
wages, taxation and regulation to countries with relatively lower levels.” Daschbach,
supra note 87, at 24–25 (quoting Debora L. Spar & David B. Yoffie, Multinational
Enterprises and the Prospects for Justice, 52 J. INT’L AFF. 563–64 (1999)). See also
Brian R. Copeland & M. Scott Taylor, Trade, Growth and the Environment, 42 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 7, 9 (2004) (discussing the “race to the bottom” concept as it pertains to environmental protection).
90
See infra note 95–98 and accompanying text.
91
Economies tied to the export of a single natural resource are said to suffer
from the “resource curse.” While logic would seem to indicate that having an abundance of a primary commodity like oil, ample evidence indicates that “primary commodity dependence is likely to be bad news for development.” Paul Collier & Anke
Hoeffler, Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 625, 627
(2005). Because state income is not derived from a tax base, there is less incentive
for the government to manage the funds properly—and whomever can control the
geographic region where the resources are extracted wields significant power. Additionally, reliance on a single primary commodity makes the entire economy prone to
global price shocks and quantity shocks. Both of these problems increase the likelihood of conflict, “confuse citizens’ comprehension of government performance.” Id.
See also Michael L. Ross, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse, 51 WORLD
POL. 297, 301–07 (1999).
92
U.N. DEV. PROG., HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT: NIGERIA 2008-2009:
ACHIEVING
GROWTH
WITH
EQUITY,
47
(2009),
available
at
http://www.ng.undp.org/documents/NHDR2009/NHDR_MAIN-REPORT_20082009.pdf.
93
Two-thirds of Nigerians live on less than one dollar per day. EBERE
ONWUDIWE & CHLOE BERWIND-DART, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, BREAKING THE CYCLE OF
ELECTORAL
VIOLENCE
IN
NIGERIA
9
(2010),
available
at
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR263Breaking_the_Cycle_of_Electoral_Violence_in_Nigeria.pdf.
94
Human Development Index (HDI) - 2011 Rankings, U.N. DEV. PROGRAM,
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ (last updated Nov. 2, 2011).
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Due to federal ownership of resources and the NNPC’s unitary,
but inefficient, control of the oil industry within Nigeria, oil-related
financial transactions have traditionally occurred with little or no input from the populations most affected by the extraction.95 The major
oil corporations operating in the Niger Delta have also taken care to
build relationships with senior government bureaucrats and to place
influential Nigerians on their boards of directors.96 This way, the
MNCs get oil, the federal government gets paid, and the transaction
typically ends without due consideration of the day-to-day operations
of the oil companies in the region.97 As a result, the oil companies
have developed “abysmal oil-field practices characterized by, among
other things, hazardous seismographic operations, poor installation
and maintenance of pipelines . . . and regular blowouts.”98
2.

Oil Spills

The Deepwater Horizon spill puts the situation in Nigeria in perspective. Since extraction began in the 1950s, an estimated 546 million gallons of oil have spilled into the Niger Delta, or approximately
11 million gallons per year.99 This figure is more than double the
amount spilled into the Gulf of Mexico, and more than fifty times the
95
Uwafiokun Idemudia & Uwem E. Ite, Demystifying the Niger Delta Conflict: Towards an Integrated Explanation, 33 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 391, 394–95
(2006); see also INT’L CRISIS GROUP, NIGERIA’S FALTERING FEDERAL EXPERIMENT 4
(2006),
available
at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/westafrica/nigeria/Nigerias%20Faltering%20Federal%20Experiment.pdf.
“The NNPC
has not been a well-managed entity and its turbulent strategies, complex structures
and continuous management and staff changes have had negative impacts over the
years. In 1996 more than 3,000 employees, including over 600 directors and top
officials, were sacked in a move touted as being ‘in the public interest and to enhance
efficiency.’” CLARKE, supra note 73, at 108.
96
Ike Okonta, The Disease of Elephants: Oil Rich ‘Minority’ Areas, Shell
and International NGOs, in GULLIVER’S TROUBLES: NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY
AFTER THE COLD WAR 116, 122 (Adekeye Adebajo & Abdul Raufu Mustapha eds.,
2008).
97
Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, The Impact of Economic and Social Rights in
Nigeria: An Assessment of the Legal Framework for Implementing Education and
Health as Human Rights, in COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE 183, 200 (Varun Gauri &
Daniel M. Brinks, eds., 2008).
98
Id. See also FOSSIL FUELS, OIL COMPANIES, AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES,
supra note 75, at 69–74.
99
Adam Nossiter, Half a World from the Gulf, a Spill Scourge 5 Decades
Old, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2010, at A1. It is important to note, however, that the
figures regarding the amount of oil spilled vary considerably based on the source.
Official figures from the Nigerian government rely on self-reported spill data from the
oil companies. Those figures are significantly lower than those calculated by international sources. See PETROLEUM, POLLUTION & POVERTY, supra note 78, at 15–16.
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amount spilled into Prince William Sound.100 A number of international environmental groups list the Niger Delta as “among the five
most polluted regions in the world.”101 More than half of the region’s
population has no access to clean water as a result.102
Despite the massive wealth that the region’s oil generates for the
country, the majority of the region’s residents eke out a subsistence
living—dependent on the natural environment for agriculture and fishing.103 This means that the impact of oil spills in the region has as
great an impact on the economy as on the environment. When oil
spills occur on farmland, the growing crops rarely survive, and because clean-up efforts are often minimal, the toxic substances in the
oil104 have a long-term detrimental impact on soil fertility.105 Delta
fishermen, once responsible for feeding much of the country’s interior, now cannot even feed their families since few can afford the boat
engines needed to leave the Delta for fresher waters.106 Oil therefore
attacks Delta residents on all fronts, affecting their livelihoods, living
conditions, and their lives.
3.

Gas Flaring

Gas flaring, the practice of burning off natural gas from crude oil
before it is refined,107 is a round-the-clock process in the Niger Delta.
100

Nossiter, supra note 99; see also Caroline Duffield, Nigeria: ‘World Oil
Pollution
Capital’
BBC
NEWS
(June
15,
2010,
6:33
AM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10313107 (commenting on the divergent levels of attention paid to oil spills in Nigeria vs. the Gulf of Mexico).
101
Okonta, supra note 96, at 118.
102
John Vidal, Nigeria’s Agony Dwarfs the Gulf Oil Spill. All We Do Is Ignore It, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), May 30, 2010, at 20. A large number of communities
must “depend on untreated surface water and wells for drinking water, which leads to
health problems from waterborne diseases.” PETROLEUM, POLLUTION & POVERTY,
supra note 78, at 25. Studies of groundwater in the Delta region confirm that “without
standard treatment is unfit for drinking and domestic uses.” I.M. Adenkunle, et al.,
Assessment of Groundwater Quality in a Typical Rural Settlement in Southwest Nigeria, 4 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 307, 316 (2007); see also I. O. Asia, The
Effects of Petroleum Exploration and Production Operations on the Heavy Metal
Contents of Soil and Groundwater in Nigeria, 2 INT’L J. PHYSICAL SCI. 271, 272
(2007).
103
PETROLEUM, POLLUTION & POVERTY, supra note 78, at 14. The land in the
region was previously arable. Olowu, supra note 78, at 80.
104
See supra Part I.A.
105
PETROLEUM, POLLUTION & POVERTY, supra note 78, at 30.
106
Tom O’Neill, Curse of the Black Gold: Hope and Betrayal on the Niger
Delta.
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
(Feb.
2007),
available
at
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2007/02/nigerian-oil/oneill-text/1.
107
Brown E. Umukoro, Gas Flaring, Environmental Corporate Responsibility and the Right to a Healthy Environment: The Case of the Niger Delta, in LAW AND
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The gas spouts from “controlled infernos” so large that the fires can
be seen from space.108 Many of the region’s gas flares are “near
communities and farms and the burn continuously for several years at
a time.”109 Flaring has serious environmental consequences, as the
emissions released are the greenhouse gases that contribute to global
warming.110 It also has serious health consequences, as those same
emissions contain known carcinogens like benzene and PAHs.111
Airborne toxins are the most dangerous as they rapidly enter the
bloodstream once inhaled and are then distributed throughout the
body by natural physiological processes.112 Further, the climate of the
Niger Delta is rainy and tropical, so the chemicals released into the
atmosphere return almost as quickly as acid rain.113 Flaring is, however, the cheapest way to get rid of waste gas, so the practice persists
despite the serious risks it poses and the fact that the practice was outlawed by the Nigerian federal government in 1979.114
4.

Oil and Violence in the Niger Delta

Blame for the extensive environmental and economic damage to
the region can be divided among a wide variety of actors. The prima-

PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA: CURRENT CHALLENGES 49, 50 (Festus Emiri &
Gowon Deinduomo eds., 2009). Because industry is so limited in Nigeria, there is
very little demand for gas. Id. at 50–51.
108
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CHOP FINE: THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION AND MISMANAGEMENT IN RIVERS STATE, NIGERIA
20
(2007),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria0107[1].pdf [hereinafter CHOP
FINE]. See also Karin Brulliard, In Oil-Rich Niger Delta, the Sun Never Sets, WASH.
POST, Aug. 30, 2009, A14; Ofeibea Quist-Arcton, Gas Flaring Disrupts Life in OilProducing
Niger
Delta,
NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(July
24,
2007),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12175714.
109
Marcus O. Edino, et al., Perceptions and Attitudes Towards Gas Flaring
in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. 30 ENVIRONMENTALIST 67, 68 (2010).
110
Id. Nigeria burns more gas than any country except Russia. See Brulliard,
supra note 108.
111
Id; see supra Part I.A; see also ANDREW SIMMS & HANNAH REID, AFRICA:
UP IN SMOKE?, 20–21 (2005).
112
TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE, supra note 5, at 3.
113
Umukoro, supra note 107, at 53.
114
Edino, supra note 109, at 67; Umukoro, supra note 107, at 51. That law
was enforced by a Nigerian Federal High Court in 2005, but a legal loophole allows
the federal government to grant an oil company a certificate permitting continued
flaring. Id. See also Ibibia Worika, Energy Development and Utilization in Africa, in
THE LAW OF ENERGY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 324, 338 (Adrian J. Bradbrook
et al., eds. 2005).
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ry parties constantly at odds are the MNCs and the local population.115
The locals point to poor maintenance of the thousands of miles of
pipeline, some of which were installed forty years ago and have long
since rusted and begun to leak.116 When these poorly-maintained
pipes do leak or burst, the locals allege that the MNC response is
slow, and that in the past, it has taken weeks for leaks to be repaired.117 The MNCs point to vandalism by local militant groups,
claiming that this purposeful intervening wrongdoing absolves the
corporations of liability.118 Shell has publicly blamed 98 percent of
spills from its pipelines on vandals,119 though how they allocate the
fault with any precision is unclear. The Nigerian federal government
has historically tended to side with the MNCs against its own people,
because oil is so fundamentally important to the national economy.120
What has emerged from this blame game is a cyclical crisis. Persistent environmental damage to the region has united the local population against the federal government and the MNCs. What began as
peaceful political opposition was forcefully repressed by the Nigerian
government, eliciting increasingly violent responses from the local
communities.121 Violence aimed at the oil companies and the state
115

Though hundreds of ethnic and religious fault lines divide the Nigerian
population, lack of development in the Niger Delta, political oppression, and the
federal government’s practice of aligning itself with the MNCs has in many ways had
the effect of uniting the peoples of the Niger Delta against their perceived common
enemy: the oil companies. See Richard Moncrieff, Niger Delta Fumble, WALL ST. J.,
June 10, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124457823935199275.html.
116
Vidal, supra note 102.
117
Nossiter, supra note 99.
118
Vidal, supra note 102.
119
Id.
120
Jedrzej George Frynas & Kamel Mellahi, Political Risks as Firm-Specific
(Dis)Advantages: Evidence on Transnational Oil Firms in Nigeria, 45 THUNDERBIRD
INT’L BUS. REV. 541, 550–51 (2003); Kenneth Omeje, Petrobusiness and Security
Threats in the Niger Delta, Nigeria, 54 CURRENT SOC. 477, 479 (2006) (“[I]n a bid to
protect its equity interests, the oil-dependent Nigerian state usually intervenes in
favour of petrobusiness using sundry legislations, public policy and military reprisal
in trying to resolve the conflict between the oil companies and their host communities.”).
121
The head of this peaceful resistance in the early 1990s was activist Ken
Saro-Wiwa, leader of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP),
a mass-based minority rights organization. G.N.K Vukor-Quarshie, Criminal Justice
Administration in Nigeria: Saro-Wiwa in Review, CRIM. L. F., Oct. 1997, at 87, 88–
90. Wiwa primarily attempted to raise awareness about the environmental degradation done in the Delta by oil companies and about lack of local representation in resource-related decisions. Id. At that time the Nigerian state was governed by a military dictatorship that dealt harshly with opposition, particularly in an area as economically critical to the nation as the Delta. Id. Saro-Wiwa and a number of his fellow
leaders were arrested, “tried” and executed in such rapid succession that their execu-
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has not only increased the pollution in the region, but also decreased
the willingness of the government and oil companies to negotiate with
the locals-turned-militants.122 The violence also distracts from the
underlying issues: the abject poverty and terrible health consequences
that the average Delta resident must endure.
Nigerian federal regulatory mechanisms for the economy and environment are very weak due to a combination of lack of capacity and
lack of political will. MNCs therefore effectively operate with impunity.123 The oil revenues that the federal government remit to the state
and local governments have largely been squandered due to a complete lack of accountability regarding how government revenues are
spent once they are redistributed.124 With their political and administion was clearly planned from the moment they were apprehended. Such a reaction
by the state to peaceful political protest was a catalyst for the more violent responses
that followed, and the militarization of the groups opposing the presence of the
MNCs. Id. The British government publicly condemned Saro-Wiwa’s execution, and
suspended Nigeria from the Commonwealth in 1995. See IKE OKONTA, WHEN
CITIZENS REVOLT: NIGERIAN ELITES, BIG OIL, AND THE OGONI STRUGGLE FOR SELFDETERMINATION 4 (2008). These events also eventually gave rise to litigation in the
United States under the Alien Tort Claims Act, which is discussed in Part IV.B of this
Note. Nigerian nationals brought suit against Shell in US federal court for the oil
company’s alleged involvement in the imprisonment and execution of Saro-Wiwa and
his fellow leaders. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir.
2000). In 2009, Shell agreed to settle with the plaintiffs in Wiwa for $15.5 million.
Jad Mouawad, Shell to Pay $15.5 Million to Settle Nigerian Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,
2009, at B1.
122
Because oil is so vital to the national economy, “[t]he government sees the
activities of the protesting oil communities and the armed militias as acts of economic
sabotage to the main source of national revenues and a challenge to its power in the
Niger Delta.” Cyril Obi, Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Understanding the Complex Drivers
of Violent Oil-Related Conflict, 34 AFR. DEV. 103, 107 (2009). This has raised the
stakes dramatically in any confrontation between militants and the government, and
has made the government more prone to adverse action rather than cooperation. Id.
123
Odinkalu, supra note 97, at 200; see Rogge, supra note 88, at 314.
124
An estimated $380 billion in public funds were stolen by government
officials between 1960 – 1999. CHOP FINE, supra note 108, at 16. Former governors
Peter Odili and James Ibori, the former of Rivers State and the latter of Delta State,
are accused of the theft of billions of dollars during their terms in office. Id. See also
Nigeria Ex-Governor James Ibori Arrested in Dubai, BBC NEWS (May 13, 2010, 4:28
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8680569.stm. Though no charges have yet
been brought against Odili, money laundering charges against Ibori have been filed in
the United Kingdom. Id. Ibori was arrested in Dubai in May 2010, and his extradition to the UK was approved in October 2010. Nigerian Ex-Governor Faces Extradition from Dubai to UK, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2010 11:27 AM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11986056. Ibori was subsequently found
guilty of ten counts of money laundering, and has been sentenced to thirteen years in
the United Kingdom. Former Nigeria Governor James Ibori Jailed for 13 Years,
BBC NEWS (Apr. 17, 2012, 1:08 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa17739388.
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trative avenues foreclosed, the only way local groups have found to
actually affect change has been through violence.125 Unfortunately,
this militarized response, which has typically involved blowing up
pipelines and causing leaks, is then used by the MNCs to escape liability for pollution.126 Pipeline vandalism is certainly responsible for
some of the Delta oil spills, but so long as the MNCs can hide behind
militants to avoid responsibility for any wrongdoing, violent responses will continue, and the cyclical crisis will repeat itself.
Resolution of the armed conflict in the Niger Delta has as much to
do with properly-timed action as with the substantive changes that
will facilitate that resolution. Intermittent conflict has plagued the
region for decades,127 and the fractionalized, guerilla nature of the
armed groups involved means that placating one contingent may have
little impact on the overall level of violence.128 Still, a number of
ceasefires, most recently in July 2009, have been negotiated between
the government and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger
Delta (MEND), the region’s largest militant group.129 Ceasefire and
125
Though pipeline vandalism hasn’t had any real impact on how the MNCs
operate in the region, it has impacted the profit margins of the MNCs. Though Nigeria’s oil exports are considerable, they could actually be much higher but-for the
instability in the region that has caused MNCs to shut in production. See EIA
COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEF, supra note 1, at 2. Further complicating the security
environment, Delta militant groups have taken to kidnapping foreign oil workers for
ransom. See Nicholas Schmidle, The Hostage Business, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 4,
2009, at MM14. The increased frequency of hostage-taking “has also made oil and
gas service companies increasingly reluctant to dispatch personnel to repair sabotaged
or ruptured pipelines.” ALEX IANNACCONE, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD.,
TOWARD A REFORM AGENDA FOR THE NIGER DELTA 2 (2007), available at
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070423_nigerdelta.pdf. Because the Nigerian
state is unable to adequately control the security environment, oil companies provide
their own security, often by arming local gangs on a contract basis. While arguably
serving a purpose, this practice draws more young people into the conflict, and injects
more weapons into a region fraught with firearms. Omeje, supra note 120, at 478,
487.
126
These causation problems, in the context of establishing tort liability, will
be discussed infra, at Part IV.C.2.
127
Judith Burdin Asuni, Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta
5–6 (Council on Foreign Relations, Working Paper, Sept. 2009), available at
http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/understanding-armed-groups-niger-delta/p20146.
128
Id. at 19; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, POLITICS AS WAR: THE HUMAN
RIGHTS IMPACT AND CAUSES OF POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE IN RIVERS STATE, NIGERIA
54
(2008),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria0308webwcover.pdf.
129
Nigerian Rebels Declare Ceasefire, BBC NEWS (July 15, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8150965.stm; Joe DeCapua, Nigeria’s Niger Delta
Called Pacified, VOICE OF AMERICA (Dec. 28, 2010, 7:00 PM),
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/offor-decapua-niger-delta-29dec10112602459.html.
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peace are not synonymous, however.130 Peace is a broad, long-term,
comprehensive process, of which a ceasefire is a critical, but singular
part.131 If no real efforts to solve the underlying problems follow the
ceasefire, relapse into the status quo ante is inevitable. Such was the
case with the July 2009 ceasefire: by January 2010, the militants had
released a statement ending the truce, citing the federal government’s
failure to take meaningful action with respect to Delta grievances as
the impetus for the resumption of hostilities.132
The Nigerian government has explicitly refused international assistance in mediating the Delta conflict, preferring to handle the militant movement as purely an internal, domestic matter.133 With certain
political avenues foreclosed, an alternative means to satisfy the marginalized residents of the Niger Delta is necessary. Though the majority of Delta residents do not directly participate in the violence and
vandalism, many are frustrated enough to believe that “the enemy of
my enemy is my friend,” and thereby tacitly support the militants.134
Financially compensating these residents for harms suffered due to oil
extraction could help eliminate local support for violence.135 This
compensation could best begin is best obtained in the courtroom.
130
Conflict resolution is a complex, multi-step process. Ceasefires/cessations
of hostilities, while obviously a critical part of the process, are only one step. If a
ceasefire isn’t followed up by negotiations, peace agreements, and legitimate efforts
by parties to the conflict to reconcile their differences and address the underlying
problems that precipitated the violence, relapse into violence is far more likely than
progress towards peace. See OLIVER RAMSBOTHAM ET AL., CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 11–14 (2005).
131
Id.
132

Nigeria Militants ‘End Truce in Delta Region’, BBC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2010, 2:50
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8488772.stm.
133

DAVID SMOCK, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, CRISIS IN THE NIGER DELTA 6 (2009),
available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/niger_delta_crisis.pdf. History indicates that this insistence may be ill-advised. As of 2008, fifteen separate attempts,
beginning in 1958, have been made by committees which have recommended ways to
address and solve the problems in the Niger Delta. The problems are still ongoing,
indicating that none of these efforts proved fruitful—and that a change in tactics
might be necessary. TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON THE NIGER DELTA, REPORT OF THE
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON THE NIGER DELTA 14 (2008).
134
See Asuni, supra note 127, at 22.
135
Many commentators on the violence in the Niger Delta have characterized
the militant movement as an insurgency. See, e.g., Ukoha Ukiwo, From “Pirates” to
“Militants”: A Historical Perspective on Anti-State and Anti-Oil Company Mobilization Among the Ijaw of Warri, Western Niger Delta, 106 AFR. AFF. 587, 590 (2007).
A central tenet of counterinsurgency theory is that defeating a movement that has
local support requires targeting the political grievances that fuel the insurgency. Eliot
Cohen et al., Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency, MILITARY
REV., Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 49, 50. Rather than killing every insurgent, targeting the
roots causes the movement to “die on the vine.” Id. See also James D. Fearon &
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LITIGATING A SOLUTION

As soon as the Exxon Valdez ran aground and the Deepwater
Horizon rig exploded, the public condemnation of Exxon and BP,
respectively, began in earnest. Because these tragedies occurred so
close to home, the American people, media, and government registered their complaints swiftly and loudly.136 The outpouring of outrage by the American media against BP has in turn triggered an outpouring of outrage by Nigerians who have dealt with similar and
worse oil spills for decades with little or no public attention or condemnation.137
A.

Domestic Suits against MNCs under Nigerian Law
1.

The Nigerian Judicial System

Discussion of potential litigation against an MNC in Nigeria must
begin with a brief description of the Nigerian judiciary.138 Popular
expectations of the Nigerian legal system are low, for a variety of
reasons. Though a comprehensive judicial structure is in place,139 and
there are constitutional and statutory provisions for individual rights
and legal procedures, “the troubling legacies of military rule, especially corruption, executive control and manipulation of the judiciary,
continue to undermine the ability of courts to effectively secure fair
trial rights.”140 There have been more successful military coups in
Nigeria than in any other African country.141 Years of intermittent
David D. Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 75, 80
(2003) (“Recruiting young men to the life of a guerrilla is easier when the economic
alternatives are worse.”).
136
Clifford Krauss et al., White House Tries to Regroup as Criticism Mounts
Over Leak, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2010, at A1; Anna Driver & Matthew Bigg, BP
Swamped
by
Criticism,
REUTERS
(May
21,
2010),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6430AR20100521.
137
Vidal, supra note 102; Nossiter, supra note 99; Christian Purefoy, Nigerians Angry at Oil Pollution Double Standards, CNN.COM (June 30, 2010, 7:33 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/06/29/nigeria.oil/index.html.
138
See generally JEDRZEJ GEORG FRYNAS, OIL IN NIGERIA: CONFLICT AND
LITIGATION BETWEEN OIL COMPANIES AND VILLAGE COMMUNITIES 92–94 (2000).
139
See Odinkalu, supra note 97, at 196.
140
Okechukwu Oko, Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies: An Analysis of
the Problems and Failures of the Judiciary in Nigeria, 31 BROOK. J. INT. LAW 9, 14
(2005).
141
MONTY G. MARSHALL, CTR. FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE, CONFLICT TRENDS IN
AFRICA, 1946-2004: A MACRO-COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 53–61 (2005), available at
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military interference in politics have left the judiciary institutionally
weak and purposely underdeveloped.142 Rather than allowing for institutional checks and balances, “successive military regimes . . . abolished the powers of the courts to inquire into any action or decision of
the government.”143
Additionally, during their colonial period, the British imposed legal traditions on Nigeria with little regard for how European institutional formalities translated to the Nigerian setting.144 The result has
been a growing alienation of the poor and illiterate majority from a
legal process that is expensive, inaccessible, and perceived as protecting only the interests of urban elites.145 Though the Nigerian constitution requires the legislature to provide indigent citizens with access to
legal representation,146 legal services are predominately located in
urban areas, and “are arguably beyond the reach of a majority of the
population.”147
Nigerian government institutions have had more trouble with corruption than most,148 and the judicial system is no exception. The
http://www.systemicpeace.org/Conflict%20Trends%20in%20Africa.pdf. Nigeria has
been ruled by military regimes for 31 of the 51 years since its independence in 1960.
Chinonye Obiagwu & Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, Nigeria: Combatting Legacies of
Colonialism and Militarism, in HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS 211,
212 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im ed., 2003). These military regimes have been
described as “often brutal and mostly inefficient.” CLARKE, supra note 73, at 84.
142
Oko, supra note 140, at 14.
143
Obiagwu & Odinkalu, supra note 141, at 212–13.
144
The British utilized an indirect rule system in the majority of their colonies. Indirect rule was characterized by attempts to preserve traditional authority to
carry out the majority of government functions thereby gaining legitimacy by cooperating with locals and preserving native custom. In implementing this strategy in
Nigeria, the British created parallel court systems: colonial courts applying British
law for matters in which Crown subjects were involved, and a separate system to
adjudicate disputes between Nigerians. The result was “extensive confusion as to the
appropriate forum for disputes as well as the relevant sources of legal authority.”
Ronald J. Daniels, et al., The Legacy of Empire: The Common Law Inheritance and
Commitments to Legality in Former British Colonies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 111, 133
(2011).
145
Okechukwu Oko, The Problems and Challenges of Lawyering in Developing Societies. 35 RUTGERS L. J. 569, 605–06 (2004).
146
CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), §§ 46(4)(a)–(b).
147
Odinkalu, supra note 97, at 198.
148
Transparency International, an international non-governmental organization that monitors perceptions of corporate and political corruption by country, ranked
Nigeria 143/182 according to its 2011 index. On a scale of 0-10, with 0 being Highly
Corrupt and 10 being Clean, Nigeria was rated at a 2.4. TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2011 at 3(Dec. 2011), available at
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results.
See
also Nigeria’s Struggle with Corruption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Africa,
Global Human Rights and International Operations of the H. Comm. on International
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average Nigerian sees the courts not as “impartial dispensers of justice,” but rather as “auctioneers . . . willing to distort legal principles
and established legal rules in favor of the highest bidder.”149 Nigerian
“[c]itizens, lawyers, and even eminent jurists now openly
acknowledge that the judicial system is no longer a realistic forum for
obtaining justice, especially for citizens who lack the resources and
social connections to influence the outcome of the judicial proceedings.”150 Judges are also poorly paid, which makes some even more
susceptible to bribe-taking.151 The meagerness of judicial salaries has
also traditionally discouraged otherwise-prominent, well-qualified
Nigerian jurists from seeking judicial appointments.152
It may take five to six years for a case to be heard in a Nigerian
superior court, and those cases that are eventually heard proceed with
no real sense of urgency.153 Court facilities are “hopelessly overcrowded, badly equipped, and underfunded” and a lack of “computers,
photocopiers, or other modern equipment [means that] judges may
even have to supply their own paper and pen to record their judgment
in longhand.”154 In the 1960s, when the current evidentiary and procedural rules were developed, a judge in Lagos, Nigeria’s most populous city, might hear six cases per week.155 In 2003, the docket list for
a judge in that same position was one hundred cases per day.156 Compounding this already-incredible problem, when a judge is transferred
“and a new one takes over a case [the action] has to start de novo.”157
The legal system’s lack of technology also impairs the alreadyuncertain rights of individuals to due process. Presentation of techRelations, 109th Cong. 109-172 (2006) (statement of Rep. Smith, Chairman, Subcomm. on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations).
149
Oko, supra note 145, at 633.
150
Oko, supra note 140, at 16. See also J.N.C. Hill, Corruption in the Courts:
the Achilles Heel of Nigeria’s Regulatory Framework?, 31 THIRD WORLD Q. 1161,
1172 (2010) (“The common, and largely correct, view is that, far from holding the
rich and powerful in check, the judiciary actively colludes with them.”).
151
Oko, supra note 140, at 79–80. In addition to judges being susceptible to
bribery, other necessary court officers—registrars, legal assistants, clerks—are even
more poorly and infrequently compensated. People in these positions have openly
extorted money from litigants. Obiagwu & Odinkalu, supra note 141, at 237.
152
Obiagwu & Odinkalu, supra note 141, at 237.
153
Oko, supra note 140, at 39.
154
Id. at 42 (quoting HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA’S OIL PRODUCING
COMMUNITIES 143 (1999)).
155
Obiagwu & Odinkalu, supra note 141, at 233.
156
Id. at 234.
157
Damfebo K. Derri, Litigation Problems in Compensation Claims for Oil
and Gas Operations in Nigeria, in LAW AND PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA:
CURRENT CHALLENGES, 11, 22 (Festus Emiri & Gowon Deinduomo eds., 2009).
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nical evidence is often extremely difficult, if not impossible, and that
impedes the ability of the party bearing the burden of proof (typically
the plaintiff) to present his or her case completely.158 This evidentiary
problem is particularly relevant to oil spill-related claims for which
scientific testimony on the exact harm done to property or individuals
must be demonstrated.159 Additionally, Nigerian law requires that
expert witnesses be “specially skilled in the particular field in question,” and courts have refused to admit expert testimony based on
doubts about the expert’s skill.160 Finding qualified expert witnesses,
then, is an additional cost on top of an already-expensive litigation
process.161 These obstacles have “the obvious consequence of alienating the public from, and reducing their confidence in, the justice system, and indeed, the democratic process.”162
Aside from these practical obstacles, a number of procedural particularities exist within the Nigerian judicial system that further complicate suits. Jurisdiction of trial courts, standing of individuals to
bring suit, and joinder of parties are viewed as so fundamental to the
adjudication process that a party challenging any of these has a constitutional right to an interlocutory appeal, all the way to the Nigerian
Supreme Court, before any other legal issue may be decided.163
Standing is assessed by trial judges on a case-by-case basis, and parties alleging separate injuries may not be joined.164 The prevailing
doctrinal position in Nigerian courts in regards to standing is that a
158

Oko, supra note 140, at 44.
Omolaji Adewale, Oil Spill Claims in Nigeria: Principles, Guidelines and
Criteria, 33 J. AFR. L. 91, 93 (1989).
160
FRYNAS, supra note 138, at 200. For example, in an oil spill case before a
Nigerian court, the plaintiffs’ expert “had specialist knowledge as a soil scientist and
an agronomist” but “[h]is testimony was not considered credible as he did not have
additional knowledge of radiation and heat.” Id.
161
Id. at 200–01.
162
Oko, supra note 140, at 80.
163
Odinkalu, supra note 97, at 188.
164
The Nigerian legal system approaches standing a very paradoxical manner.
The great weight given to standing would seem to indicate that the legal system could
benefit greatly from an unambiguous, bright-line rule determining when suits may be
filed, and by whom. However, the leading Nigerian case dealing with standing, was
decided almost three decades ago, and the court’s language was ambiguous. The test
articulated was that “standing will only be accorded to a plaintiff who shows that his
civil rights and obligations have been or are in danger of being violated or adversely
affected by the act complained of.” See Jedrzej George Frynas, Legal Change in
Africa: Evidence from Oil-Related Litigation in Nigeria, 43 J. AFR. L. 121, 132
(1999). The court however failed to define “civil rights and obligations,” and to this
day this lack of clarity provides the grounds for the interlocutory appeals which delay
legal proceedings. See Tunde Ogowewo, The Problem with Standing to Sue in Nigeria, 39 J. AFR. L. 1, 3–4 (1995).
159
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litigant must have a personal interest in the matter—which “precludes
the purist of impact litigation for the public interest.”165 This means
that human rights activists cannot sue on behalf of injured groups.166
This personal interest has been interpreted to mean one “over and
above that of the general public,” so the interest of a particular individual must be greater than that of any other.167 Paradoxically, then, if
the harm alleged is one that affects a community en masse (for example, an oil spill)—it is possible that no single individual has a legally
sufficient personal interest to fulfill the standing requirement.168 Too
many people’s interests have been impaired for any one of them to
assert a legal cause of action. Consequently, when it is a defendant,
the government’s automatic reflex is to challenge the jurisdiction,
standing, and/or joinder of the plaintiffs.169 This suspends and delays
the proceedings, often to such an extent that the plaintiffs are financially precluded from going forward.
Finally, even if a final decision is rendered by a court, “there is no
guarantee of enforcement or compliance.”170 While the role of any
judiciary in deciding what the law is, and how it applies to a particular
scenario is critical, absent enforcement mechanisms, those decisions
are meaningless. This is true in any context, but in Nigeria, statutory
authority for enforcement of judgments is wholly vested in the federal
Attorney-General whenever government assets are at issue.171 The
government must therefore decide to punish itself; not surprisingly,
Attorneys-General “routinely decline such consent.”172
2.

Litigation Against Oil Companies in Nigerian
Courts

Despite the considerable procedural obstacles, a number of suits
against oil companies have been tried in Nigerian courts, with mixed
results. Several Nigerian statutes technically govern the actions of oil
companies, notably the Petroleum Drilling and Production Regulation

165

Odinkalu, supra note 97, at 198.
Obiagwu & Odinkalu, supra note 141, at 233.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
These delays are considerable, and litigation can often last for more than a
decade. Odinkalu, supra note 97, at 188–89; see Frynas, supra note 164, at 132.
170
Odinkalu, supra note 97, at 190.
171
Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (1990) Cap. (407), §§ 84(1)–(3) (Nigeria);
see also Odinkalu, supra note 97, at 190.
172
Odinkalu, supra note 97, at 190.
166
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Act of 1969 (Petroleum Act) and the Oil Pipelines Act of 1956.173
Regulation 25 of the Petroleum Act states that:
The licensee . . . shall adopt all practicable precautions, including the provision of up-to-date equipment . . . to prevent the
pollution of inland waters, rivers, watercourses . . . or the high seas
by oil, mud or other . . . substances which might contaminate the
water, banks or shoreline or which might cause harm . . . to fresh
water or marine life, and where any such pollution occurs or has
occurred, shall take prompt steps to control and, if possible, end
it.174

Despite affirmatively assigning monitoring and clean-up responsibilities to the oil companies in exchange for drilling licenses, the
Petroleum Act includes no penalties for nonperformance.175 It has
therefore failed to provide legal protection for victims of oil spills.
The Oil Pipelines Act establishes that individuals “whose land . . .
may be injuriously affected by the grant of a [drilling] licence may
within the period specified . . . lodge verbally or in writing . . . notice
of objection stating the interest of the objector and the grounds of objection,” technically granting ordinary citizens a voice in oil operations.176 It also enumerates a broad range of damage options available
to individuals for harm caused by oil operations, including for:
(a) any damage done to any buildings, crops or profitable trees
by the holder of the licence in the exercise of the rights conferred
by the licence; and
(b) any disturbance caused by the holder in the exercise of
such rights; and
(c) any damage suffered by any person by reason of any neglect on the part of the holder or his agents, servants or workmen
to protect, maintain or repair any work, structure or thing executed
under the licence; and
(d) any damage suffered by any person . . . as a consequence
of any breakage of or leakage from the pipeline or an ancillary installation; and
173
Petroleum Act (1990) Cap. 350 (Nigeria), available at http://www.nigerialaw.org/Petroleum%20Act.htm [hereinafter Petroleum Act]; Oil Pipelines Act (1990)
Cap.
338
(Nigeria),
available
at
http://www.nigerialaw.org/Oil%20Pipelines%20Act.htm [hereinafter Oil Pipelines Act].
174
Petroleum Act §9.25.
175
Simon Warikiyei Amaduobogha, Environmental Regulation of Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) in the Oil and Gas Sector, in LAW AND PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA: CURRENT CHALLENGES, 115, 120 (Festus Emiri & Gowon
Deinduomo eds., 2009).
176
Oil Pipelines Act § 9.
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(e) loss (if any) in value of the land or interests in land by reason of the exercise of the rights as aforesaid. 177

These statutory provisions outlawing pollution and providing for administrative recourse and monetary compensation for victims, historically, have not meant much in practice. Prior to the 1990s, tort litigation efforts by Nigerians against oil companies were almost wholly
unsuccessful.178
In addition to the general procedural difficulties discussed above,
in negligence tort actions in Nigeria, the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to establish that the defendant “owes him/her a duty of care,
that the duty was breached and that damage resulted from the breach
of duty.”179 Proving negligence has traditionally been very difficult
for plaintiffs because of the technical specifics of oil operations, in
part because defendant oil companies have a decided informational
advantage.180 Individual plaintiffs often do not know what exactly has
gone wrong—just that a pipeline has leaked and turned their land into
an oil slick—and this information gap means that most cases are won
by defendant oil companies.181
Plaintiffs have attempted to bring damage claims based on strict
liability, but with very limited success. The “precedent” most favorable to Nigerian plaintiffs in strict liability actions is the British case
Rylands v. Fletcher, where the House of Lords found that when a person has on his land “anything likely to do mischief if it escapes . . .
[he] is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural
consequence of its escape.”182 Plaintiffs were successful against Shell
in one instance under this theory. One of Shell’s oil waste pits was
allowed to overflow, resulting in substantial damage to the plaintiffs’
farmland and pond.183 Because the plaintiff’s burden of proof in a
strict liability case is just that damage was done, this would seem an
attractive legal option for plaintiffs who seek damages for pipelines
that are poorly maintained and thereby create the dangerous circumstance.184

177

Id. at § 20.
Kaniye S.A. Ebeku, Judicial Attitudes to Redress for Oil-Related Environmental Damage in Nigeria. 12 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL L. 199, 202
(2003).
179
Frynas, supra note 164, at 123.
180
Id. at 124.
181
Id.
182
Rylands v. Fletcher [1868] L.R. 3 H.L.330.
183
Frynas, supra note 164, at 126–27.
184
Rylands, L.R. 3 H.L.330.
178
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But imposition of strict liability is subject to a number of exceptions.185 These exceptions include consent, statutory authority, “acts
of God,” and third-party intervention.186 Consent by the plaintiff and
statutory authority to perform the inherently dangerous act negate
strict liability in tort.187 Acts of God, analogous to the American
“forces of nature” exception to strict liability, similarly exempt a defendant from liability for otherwise tortious conduct.188 The primary
defense utilized by MNCs, however, is third-party intervention (e.g.,
vandalism).189 If an oil company can establish that a third party sabotaged pipeline operations, it is not liable for the resulting damages. 190
Oil companies have successfully defended a number of lawsuits by
asserting this sabotage defense.191
Even plaintiffs capable of navigating the Nigerian procedural
maze successfully enough to litigate a full trial rarely get the verdicts
they seek. Injunctions have been sought in a number of actions with
negligible success.192 Judges, under considerable political pressure,
consistently find that the state’s economic interest in the revenues
generated by oil exports far outweighs any negative impact industry
practices may have had on citizens.193 Accordingly, they have traditionally declined to take any action that would impose liability on
Nigeria’s foreign partners, despite statutory provisions that explicitly
prohibit or regulate MNC operations.194
Nevertheless, since the 1990s, Nigerian courts have made better
efforts to enforce the law, and have, in a handful of cases, awarded
monetary damages to plaintiffs injured by the oil companies.195 These
favorable verdicts are not necessarily synonymous with successes,
however, because the damage awards have been comparatively small.
Damage awards have been for short-term, individual compensation
only (e.g., for the monetary value of crops damaged by an oil spill),
not, for instance, for long-term environmental or health damages
185

FRYNAS, supra note 138, at 196.
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 195–96; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 510 (1977).
189
FRYNAS, supra note 138, at 196.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id. at 189–90 (“Nigerian courts are very reluctant to grant an injunction in
oil-related cases. For oil companies, this interpretation of the law…is favourable
because the law allows them to continue with their exploration and production activities, notwithstanding the adverse impact of oil operations on village communities.”).
193
Frynas, supra note 164, at 127.
194
Ebeku, supra note 178, at 202.
195
Jedrzej George Frynas, Social and Environmental Litigation Against
Transnational Firms in Africa, 42 J. MODERN AFR. STUD. 363, 371–73 (2004).
186

566

HEALTH MATRIX

[Vol. 22: 535]

caused by contamination of drinking water.196 The prevailing standard—”fair and adequate compensation”—covers only proven, quantifiable compensatory damages, and does not account for loss of future
earnings, pain and suffering, or any of the other categories of tort
damages available in the United States.197 Until 1997, no award of
damages for oil-related legal action in a Nigerian court was greater
than $275,000.198 When contrasted with the billions of dollars paid by
Exxon and BP for their respective spills,199 it is clear that Nigerian
damage awards are inadequate, and pale in comparison to the magnitude of harm and the amount of effort required to prevail in a lawsuit.
Some commentators have written very favorably about the implications of these rare legal successes,200 but the ratio of successful
plaintiffs to victims indicates that this optimism is premature. For
practical and procedural reasons, the number of individuals able to
persevere in the Nigerian judicial system is very small, particularly in
relation to the number of individuals who have been harmed. Many
never consider legal recourse in the first place, because the judicial
system just seems too inaccessible.201 Furthermore, the small damage
awards that MNCs have been ordered to pay have not been nearly
harsh enough to encourage more responsible operational practices.202
Moreover, compensation after the fact can only do so much good. It
would be better to prevent the harmful conduct in the first place, but
history indicates that the Nigerian judicial system is unwilling to bite
the hand that feeds, and impose any legitimate penalties on MNCs.
Though the Nigerian legal system should by no means be treated
as a lost cause, at present, it is not the most viable road to recovery for
victims of oil spills in the Niger Delta who are suffering real damage
in real time. And the increasingly violent responses of the local popu196
Ebeku, supra note 178, at 207. In the instances where the oil companies
have agreed to compensate spill victims, they have provided money for immediate
economic losses, but have failed to undertake environmental remediation efforts
necessary to mitigate future losses. Id. at 204–05. So although arable farmland may
have been destroyed by toxic exposure to crude oil, the big-picture concerns (how the
plaintiff will make his living next year or 10 years later) are ignored, and payment is
only made for short-term losses. Id.
197
Frynas, supra note 164, at 139. Further, there is no established definition
for “fair and adequate compensation,” leaving the courts to decide on a case-by-case
basis what this term means. Derri, supra note 157, at 19.
198
Frynas, supra note 164, at 142.
199
See supra Part II.
200
See Frynas, supra note 164, at 121.
201
See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text.
202
Ebeku, supra note 178, at 199, 206–07 (exploring, and ultimately disagreeing with Frynas’s theory that rulings by Nigerian judges demonstrated a shift in
jurisprudence toward environmental protection).
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lations to the errors and excesses of the oil companies indicate that
waiting for the readiness of the Nigerian legal system may be too dangerous. Would-be Nigerian plaintiffs may therefore achieve more
success by attempting to recover in foreign forums. Nigerian plaintiffs have some experience litigating claims against oil companies
abroad, both in the U.S and Europe.203 Nigerians may be able to litigate in the United States, since federal courts can exercise jurisdiction
via the Alien Tort Statute or common law long-arm statutes.
B.

U.S. Federal Tort Claims Under the Alien Tort
Statute204

The Alien Tort Statute (ATS), codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1350, was
enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789.205 It states that “the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”206 This potentially very expansive statute
then lay dormant for almost two centuries, until 1980, when it was
invoked in modern litigation for the first time in Filartiga v. PenaIrala.207 In this landmark decision, the District Court for the Eastern
District of New York heard arguments by Paraguayan nationals
against the Paraguayan police for violation of human rights norms,
after the plaintiffs’ son was allegedly tortured by the police.208 The
district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but the Second Circuit
reversed, using a combination of international treaties and declarations to find a sufficient customary international law basis to sustain
203

Three notable cases against foreign oil companies have been brought by
Nigerians in the United States: Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 266 F.3d 88 (2d
Cir. 2000); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2010);
Bowoto v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1229 (N.D. Cal., 2004). In
2009, The Hague “decided that it was competent to...hear…a case filed for compensation for alleged damage from oil spills caused by Royal Dutch Shell’s Nigerian unit.”
Jay Wagner & Kit Armstrong, Managing Environmental and Social Risks in International Oil and Gas Projects: Perspectives on Compliance, 3 J. WORLD ENERGY L. &
BUS. 140, 156 (2010). See also Catherine Hornby, Dutch Court to Take on Shell
Nigeria
Cases,
REUTERS
(Dec.
30,
2009,
12:23
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/30/us-shell-nigeriaidUSTRE5BT1WL20091230.
204
The terms “Alien Tort Statute” and “Alien Tort Claims Act” are used
interchangeably in case law and legal commentary.
205
BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S.
COURTS 1 (2008).
206
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2010).
207
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)
208
Id. at 878–80; see also JEFFREY DAVIS, JUSTICE ACROSS BORDERS: THE
STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN U.S. COURTS 17–22 (2008).
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an ATS claim.209 Human rights activists rejoiced at this interpretation
of the all-but-forgotten statute, as it ostensibly provided an American
forum for serious harms committed abroad, providing victims with an
avenue for previously-unavailable recourse.210
Some commentators worried, though, that the decision in Filartiga would trigger a race to the courthouse by foreign plaintiffs.211 For
the most part, this flood of litigation did not materialize,212 due to the
statute’s ambiguity and a lack of clear legal precedent. By 2004, no
court had reached a judgment on the merits of an ATS case.213 Instead, the majority of ATS suits were dismissed in the early stages of
litigation for procedural reasons, even when the plaintiffs had made a
prima facie showing of subject matter jurisdiction.214
So, even after the Second Circuit opened the door in Filartiga, the
majority of circuits dismissed ATS cases, instead adopting the reasoning from the 1984 D.C. Circuit case, Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.215 In his separate concurrence to the per curiam opinion, Judge
Bork criticized the decision in Filartiga as premature;216 absent an
explicit congressional grant of a private right of action, the ATS did
not afford foreign plaintiffs access to U.S. federal courts.217 The Second and Ninth Circuits, however, allowed a small number of ATS
cases to proceed.218 Though only a few were allowed to proceed to
209

Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882.
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 205, at 12.
211
Id.
212
Id.; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Separating Myth from Reality About
Corporate Responsibility Litigation, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 263, 268 (2004) (“[T]here is
no flood of cases…Given the 215 years of the ATS’s history, more than a dozen cases
does not constitute a flood.”).
213
Koh, supra note 212, at 270.
214
Id. at 269. When foreign state entities are involved, the state action doctrine and sovereign immunity are always invoked, usually successfully. Under the
state action doctrine, “courts ‘will generally refrain from…sitting in judgment
on…acts of a governmental character done by a foreign state within its own territory .
. . .’” JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY:
LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 211–12 (2006) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 443 (1987)). Sovereign immunity,
as codified in the United States by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
provides that “foreign governments and their ‘agencies and instrumentalities’ will
generally be immune from the jurisdiction of the US courts.” ZERK, supra, at 213.
215
Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d. 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(per curiam); DAVIS, supra note 204, at 23–24.
216
Tel Oren, 726 F.2d. at 799 (Bork, J., concurring).
217
Id.
218
DAVIS, supra note 208, at 24, 114–17. Of the thirty-three cases charted by
Davis, only nine were brought outside the Second and Ninth Circuits. This is notable
because ATS claims have primarily been brought against business entities for offenses committed overseas—and many of these entities are able to be served with process
210
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judgment on the merits, the plaintiffs in those successful cases were
awarded multimillion dollar judgments.219
1.

The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort
Statute

After more than two decades of judicial ambiguity following
Filartiga, the Supreme Court heard its first ATS case in 2004. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) hired Mexican citizens, including petitioner Jose Sosa, to apprehend Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican national who had
been indicted in California for the kidnapping, torture, and murder of
a DEA agent.220 Alvarez-Machain was forcibly taken from his home
in Mexico and flown to El Paso, Texas where he was taken into federal custody.221 Alvarez-Machain was eventually acquitted, and he subsequently filed tort claims against the United States and Sosa for false
arrest and violation of the law of nations.222 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to address the ATS for the first time. 223 Eighteen
parties filed amicus briefs, underscoring the legal importance of the
outcome, since the dispute was only over $25,000 in damages.224
Ultimately, the Court held that the ATS is only a jurisdictional
statute, “enacted on the understanding that the common law would
provide a cause of action for the modest number of international law
violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.”225
Though agreeing that federal courts had constitutional authority to
hear ATS cases, the Court cautioned that the class of international
norms actionable under the ATS was narrow.226 Norms that triggered
ATS jurisdiction must be clearly defined and universally accepted.227
At the time the statute was enacted in 1789, the actions constituting
violations of the laws of nations were “violations of safe conducts,

in either New York or California because their headquarters or principal places of
business are located there. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2010); see infra Part IV.B.4 for discussion of corporations and the ATS.
219
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 205, at 16.
220
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697–98 (2004).
221
Id. at 698.
222
Id.
223
Id. at 699.
224
DAVIS, supra note 208, at 25.
225
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
226
Id. at 732.
227
Id.; DAVIS, supra note 208, at 25.
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infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”228 In modern
jurisprudence, then, “courts should require any claim based on the
present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features [that] the 18th-century paradigms . . . recognized.”229 For would-be ATS plaintiffs, then, the door to the courtroom was left “ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping.”230 The Court,
however, did not purport to identify an exhaustive list of criteria for
causes of action under the ATS,231 and the lower courts have struggled
to determine the types of torts that trigger the ATS.232
2.

Political and Procedural Obstacles to
Plaintiffs’ Successful Use of the Alien Tort
Statute

Commentators have been critical of litigation under the ATS,
voicing both procedural and public policy concerns. The backlog of
federal cases brought by U.S. citizens is already substantial without
allowing two foreign parties the opportunity to use U.S. forums when
other equally viable forums exist.233 Further, application of international law in U.S. courts, which ATS claims necessarily involve, is
unpopular, most notably with conservative jurists.234
228

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. See generally William S. Dodge, The Historical
Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the “Originalists,” 19 HASTINGS
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221 (1996).
229
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. In modern jurisprudence, then, the most egregious
offenses (for instance, genocide, torture, summary execution, slavery/forced labor)
are covered by the ATS, as these are some of the most widely recognized violations
of international law, and are illegal essentially everywhere. See also STEPHENS ET AL.,
supra note 201, at 139–70.
230
Sosa, 529 U.S. at 729.
231
Id. See also Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort
Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 542 (2011).
232
Bellia Jr. & Clark, supra note 231, at 464–65.
233
ATS suits tend to be very factually complicated, and because the events in
question took place abroad, procedural delays are common. Additionally, once plaintiffs are granted access to US forums, they are much more apt to pursue and appeal
every potential legal option. See, e.g. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d
88 (2d Cir. 2000) (the lawsuit was first filed in 1998, and wasn’t settled until 2009);
In re Agent Orange Litigation, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (the lawsuit was
first filed in 1979, and was finally dismissed in 2005).
234
See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 749–50 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The notion that a
law of nations, redefined to mean the consensus of states on any subject, can be used
by a private citizen to control a sovereign’s treatment of its own citizens within its
own territory is a 20th-century invention of internationalist law professors and human
rights advocates. The Framers would, I am confident, be appalled by the proposition
that, for example, the American peoples’ democratic adoption of the death penalty
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Private application of international law in U.S. courtrooms may
also have significant foreign policy consequences. Although plaintiffs
in ATS cases are seeking private, monetary damages, courts are public
actors.235 Accusations of crimes against humanity, for instance, are
very serious, and an American judge’s opinion about whether or not
those crimes occurred can have much more serious consequences than
just the award or denial of monetary damages to an individual plaintiff.236 Constitutional separation of powers generally requires the judiciary to defer to Congress and the Executive with respect to international affairs.237 Granting U.S. judges expansive power to punish foreign citizens, and potentially foreign governments, was recognized by
the Court in Sosa as constitutionally inappropriate.238
Though violations of certain international norms technically allow
foreign plaintiffs to bring cases in U.S. federal courts, ATS cases are
procedurally very complex, and the vast majority are dismissed before
evaluation of the merits.239 Sovereign immunity,240 the political question doctrine,241 statutes of limitations,242 and forum non conveniens243
have been successfully invoked by ATS defendants in support of dismissal, even if the violation alleged is one that would otherwise be
allowed under the narrow, post-Sosa interpretation of the ATS.244
Federal pleading requirements are stringent enough for domestic
plaintiffs—and meeting the timely filing requirements and evidentiary
could be judicially nullified because of the disapproving views of foreigners.”) (emphasis in original)(citations omitted).
235
Halina Ward, Securing Transnational Corporate Accountability Through
National Courts: Implications and Policy Options, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 451, 459 (2001).
236
Id. at 459–60. Domestic legal decisions involving international law always require consideration of international comity. Though sometimes equated with
sovereign immunity, in the United States, international comity more specifically
“requires courts to balance competing public and private interests in a manner that
takes into account any conflict between the public policies of the domestic and foreign sovereigns.” Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 19, 19 (2008). It is a broad doctrine that includes the real-world
considerations judges must weigh when deciding matters of international consequence. Id. at 19–20.
237
DAVIS, supra note 208, at 36.
238
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728–29.
239
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 205, at 12.
240
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2010); see Republic
of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004).
241
See Anderman v. Fed. Republic of Austria, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1118
(C.D. Cal. 2003).
242
See Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 317 F. 3d 1005, 1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003).
243
See infra notes 274–85 and accompanying text.
244
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 205, at 16.
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burdens becomes exponentially more difficult when persons, information, and materials must travel internationally.245
3.

Environmental Degradation and Right to
Health Claims under the ATS

What the decision in Sosa made clear is that only the most serious
human rights violations are actionable under the ATS. Though plaintiffs have attempted to utilize the ATS to recover damages for environmental degradation or detrimental health impact, these efforts have
been widely unsuccessful.246 The Sosa interpretation of the ATS,
requiring a clear and specific violation of the law of nations, precludes
use of many international environmental regulations—most of which
are indefinite.247 For example, though the United States is party to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which
proclaims rights to health and a healthy environment,248 the ICCPR
was ratified by the Senate with the explicit reservation that it was not
self-executing and did not create a private right of action in U.S.
courts.249
Particularly relevant to victims of oil spills who would seek to recover under the ATS for detriment to health is the 2003 case, Flores v.
Southern Peru Copper Corp., which preceded the limitations imposed
by Sosa.250 In Flores, Peruvian plaintiffs sought personal injury damages under the ATS for illnesses and deaths caused by pollution from
the defendant’s mines and refineries.251 The Southern District of New
York dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
245

See FED R. CIV. P. 8.
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 205, at 205. U.S. courts have continuously
dismissed ATS claims based on environmental damage. See Beanal v. FreeportMcMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 163, 167 (5th Cir. 1999) (upholding dismissal of the
plaintiff’s environmental torts claim, and noting that “federal courts should exercise
extreme caution when adjudicating environmental claims under international law to
insure that environmental policies of the United States do not displace environmental policies of other governments.”).
247
Bradford Mank, Can Plaintiffs Use Multinational Environmental Treaties
as Customary International Law to Sue Under the Alien Tort Statute?, 2007 UTAH L.
REV. 1085, 1145 (2007).
248
International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
249
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INT’L COVENANT ON CIVIL &
POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 14 (1992).
250
Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003). Given the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ATS in Sosa, a right to health claim
brought today would in all likelihood achieve the same unsuccessful outcome as in
Flores.
251
Id. at 237.
246
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the ATS, and the Second Circuit affirmed.252 Though the plaintiffs
proffered numerous international declarations and conventions in
which signatories affirmed rights to life and health, the court characterized these rights as “vague and amorphous.”253 Rather than “‘clear
and unambiguous’ rule[s] of customary international law,” the documents cited by the plaintiffs “proclaim[ed] only nebulous notions that
[were] infinitely malleable.”254
This precedent indicates that Nigerian plaintiffs may not be able
to successfully utilize the ATS for personal injury suits for toxic exposure to crude oil.255 ATS plaintiffs have met with little success
even when alleging the most egregious offenses. Moreover, there is a
pronounced dearth of federal precedent supportive of private damages
for violations of the international right to health and a healthy environment. Absent a shift in federal jurisprudence, it is unlikely the
ATS can provide a road to recovery for victims of Nigerian oil spills.
4.

The Future of the ATS: The Corporate
Liability Question

However, a shift in federal jurisprudence may be on the horizon.
The defendants in Sosa were not corporate entities, and the Supreme
Court therefore was not required to, and did not, address whether corporations could be liable under the ATS.256 Accordingly, the lower
courts have once again been required to navigate the murky waters of
ATS jurisprudence absent explicit guidance. Corresponding nicely

252

Id. at 266.
Id. at 254.
254
Id. at 254–55 (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir.
1980)). The plaintiffs had cited to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Though noting
that those treaties “express virtuous goals,” the court expressly stated that “they do
not meet the requirement of our law that rules of customary international law be clear,
definite and unambiguous.” Id. at 255.
255
Further proof of the unfriendliness of the US federal court system to right
to health claims came in Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, where foreign plaintiffs alleged
environmental abuses by the defendant mining company (in addition to allegations of
war crimes). 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2002). The court dismissed the
right to health claim. Id. at 1160.
256
Justice Souter acknowledged, in a widely-discussed footnote, a potential
distinction between individuals and corporations in terms of ATS liability. Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n. 20 (2004) (“A related consideration is whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the
perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or
individual.”).
253
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with this lack of explicit guidance has been an increasing frequency of
high-profile corporations as named defendants in ATS lawsuits.257
Major MNCs are attractive targets for ATS plaintiffs, as they have
considerable assets, and are also ineligible for a number of the procedural defenses (such as sovereign immunity) that have been utilized
successfully by defendants seeking ATS dismissals.258 Though the
status of MNCs in international law is by no means firmly established,
legal commentators,259 judicial precedent,260 and simple logic261 seem
to support the conclusion that “with great power comes great responsibility.”262
Arguably the most important ATS case litigated since Sosa has
been Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum—in which the Second Circuit
dealt with the question of corporate liability under the ATS head-on,
and answered in the negative.263 Kiobel is only the second ATS case
to reach the Supreme Court. The Kiobel plaintiffs are Nigerian citizens who claim that “Dutch, British and Nigerian corporations . . .
aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing violations
of the law of nations.”264 The underlying problems that gave rise to
the action in Kiobel are exactly those discussed in this Note; the plaintiffs further allege that Shell colluded with the Nigerian government
and military, which killed, raped, and destroyed the property of Niger
Delta residents at Shell’s behest.265
257
Saad Gul, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh
Away: An Assessment of Corporate Liability Under § 1350, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 379,
381 (2007) (“Today, the fifty or so corporations sued under the statute and the varied
locale of the alleged torts read like a veritable Who’s Who of international business.
They include: Abercrombie & Fitch, BHP, Chevron, Coca-Cola, Del Monte, Dole,
Drummond Coal, Exxon-Mobil, The Gap, J.C. Penney Co., Levis Strauss, Nike,
Pfizer, Rio Tinto, Shell, Siemens, Southern Peru Copper Corporation, Target, Texaco,
Total, Union Carbide and Unocal.”).
258
Ingrid Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law: A New
Approach, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1931, 1960 (2010).
259
Id; see Koh, supra note 212, at 264–68; see also Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 461
(2001).
260
Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F. 3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008)
(“The text of the [ATS] provides no express exception for corporations…and the law
of this Circuit is that this statute grants jurisdiction from complaints…against corporate defendants.”).
261
Koh, supra note 212, at 265 (“If corporations have rights under international law, by parity of reasoning, they must have duties as well.”).
262
SPIDERMAN (Columbia Pictures 2002).
263
621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S.
Oct. 17, 2011)(No. 10-1491).
264
Id. at 117.
265
Id. at 123.
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On September 17, 2010, the Second Circuit dismissed the cause
of action with a blanket holding that the ATS does not provide for
subject matter jurisdiction over corporations.266 Though concurring in
the judgment, Judge Leval authored a separate opinion longer than the
majority’s, criticizing its reasoning as dealing “a substantial blow to
international law and its undertaking to protect fundamental human
rights.”267 He has been joined by a chorus of legal commentators268—
and a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was filed.269 The
Supreme Court heard arguments on February 28, 2012, but issued an
order the following week restoring the case to the calendar for reargument during the next term—so as of the writing of this Note, no
resolution on the merits has been reached.270
C.

U.S. Federal Tort Claims under U.S. Tort Law

Nigerian nationals might have more success pursuing recourse in
U.S. federal courts with common law tort claims against MNCs.
Though the most active MNC in the Niger Delta is Shell, which is
based in the Netherlands, two of the other major actors, ExxonMobil
and Chevron, are U.S.-based.271 These MNCs are therefore already
subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts under 28 U.S.C. §
1332.272 Because ExxonMobil and Chevron are corporate citizens for
the purposes of U.S. law, cases against them, even by foreign nationals, are properly in U.S. court even without the help of the ATS.
266
Id. at 148–49 (“No corporation has ever been subject to any form of liability (whether civil, criminal, or otherwise) under the customary international law of
human rights. Rather, sources of customary international law have, on several occasions, explicitly rejected the idea of corporate liability. Thus, corporate liability has
not attained a discernible, much less universal, acceptance among nations of the world
in their relations inter se, and it cannot . . . as a result, form the basis of a suit under
the ATS.”) (emphasis in original).
267
Id. at 149 (Leval, J., concurring in judgment).
268
Wuerth, supra note 258, at 1965; see also Tyler Giannini & Susan
Farbstein, Corporate Accountability in Conflict Zones: How Kiobel Undermines the
Nuremberg Legacy and Modern Human Rights, 52 HARV. INT. L. J. ONLINE 119, 121
(2010); Odette Murray, David Kinley & Chip Pitts, Exaggerated Rumors of the Death
of an Alien Tort? Corporations, Human Rights and the Remarkable Case of Kiobel,
12 MELB. J. INT’L L. 57, 73–74 (2011).
269
Susan Farbstein, Kiobel Plaintiffs File Petition for Certiorari, INT’L
HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM AT HARVARD LAW SCH. (Jun. 8,
2011),
http://harvardhumanrights.wordpress.com/2011/06/08/kiobel-plaintiffs-filepetition-for-certiorari/.

270

Lyle Denniston, Kiobel to Be Expanded and Reargued, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 5, 2012, 2:01
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=140230.
271
272

See supra note 86, and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2010).
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Though the common law provides a road to recovery, this approach is not without its obstacles. The most important procedural
hurdle to common law tort claims against private, non-state actors273
is the forum non conveniens (FNC) doctrine. Foreign defendants who
don’t want to litigate in American courts always invoke FNC, as the
“first line of defense,”274 and argue that a foreign forum is more appropriate for that particular legal action.275 Courts ruling on FNC
motions are obligated to consider an array of public and private factors for and against dismissal.276 Public factors include docket congestion, avoidance of conflict of laws, and “local interest in having
localized controversies decided at home.”277 Private factors include
accessibility of evidence and witnesses, costs, and the plaintiff’s reason for choosing the original forum.278 The burden is on the defendant (typically the moving party) to establish that an alternative forum
is both available and adequate,279 and also “that the pertinent factors
‘tilt strongly in favor of trial in the foreign forum.’” 280 A foreign forum is “available” if the defendant “is subject to personal jurisdiction
there and no other procedural bar . . . prevents resolution of the merits.”281 It fulfills the adequacy requirement “when the parties will not
be deprived of all remedies or treated unfairly, even though they may
not enjoy the same benefits they might receive in an American
court.”282
Dismissal for FNC typically represents a serious setback for the
plaintiff, as it necessitates beginning the lawsuit anew in another forum.283 For that reason, dismissal on FNC grounds was historically
rare.284 Increasingly, however, defendants are actively litigating their
273

As non-state actors, the other obvious procedural hurdle, sovereign immunity, is not available to oil companies. See supra note 214.
274
Rogge, supra note 88, at 299.
275
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 205, at 391.
276
Id. at 392–93.
277
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947).
278
Id. at 508.
279
Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation:
The Impact on the Available Alternative Forum Inquiry and on the Desirability of
Forum Non Conveniens as a Defense Tactic, 56 KAN. L. REV. 609, 614 (2008).
280
STEPHENS, supra note 205, at 394 (citations omitted).
281
Heiser, supra note 279, at 614.
282
Id. at 615 (quoting Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208,
221 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted)).
283
See Heiser, supra note 279, at 609 (“A forum non conveniens dismissal
typically means that a foreign plaintiff must seek relief in the courts of his own country. As a result, a foreign plaintiff will likely recover much less than a domestic
plaintiff injured by a domestic company.”).
284
STEPHENS, supra note 205, at 392–93. Invocation of FNC has greatly
increased in the past few decades. Only twenty-five cases were decided on FNC
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motions for FNC, and “federal judges have been taking a lead in limiting access to U.S. courts by aggressively enforcing and expanding the
doctrine . . . .”285 One such case in which the defendant vigorously
litigated and eventually won its motion for FNC was Aguinda v. Texaco.286
1.

Success and Failure in Common Law
Litigation Against an MNC: Texaco in
Ecuador
a.

Round 1 – New York

An attempt to bring common law tort claims against an American
oil company began in 1994 in Aguinda v Texaco.287 The case originated as a class action by residents of the Ecuadorean Amazon against
Texaco, which was then headquartered in New York.288 The plaintiffs
alleged that Texaco’s operations had negligently discharged untreated
waste, destroying a substantial portion of Ecuador’s tropical rain forest and endangering the lives of residents by exposing them to toxic

grounds between 1965-1974; between 1975-1985, that number more than quadrupled
to 111. Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access
Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 831 (1985). Since that time, the invocation of FNC
has increased even more dramatically—with a recent estimate of forty-three cases per
year decided on those grounds. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation
and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1092 (2010) (citing Christopher A.
Whytock, Politics and the Rule of Law in Transnational Judicial Governance: The
Case of Forum Non Conveniens 15–16 (Feb. 28, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=969033).
285
Robertson, supra note 284, at 1084.
286
Aguinda v. Texaco, (Aguinda I), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
287
Id. The historical, political, geographical and socioeconomic similarities
between the extractive industries in Ecuador and Nigeria are striking. The region in
Ecuador where oil is extracted is remote but populated, and was once a diverse tropical ecosystem. Oil extraction began in the 1960s, and has since generated billions of
dollars for the federal government—making Ecuador’s leaders loathe to take action
that would diminish national revenues. Those victimized by the pollution in the region are poor ethnic minorities who have not enjoyed any of the benefits that Ecuador’s relationship with Texaco has generated. Malcolm Rogge, Ecuador’s Oil Region: Developing Community Legal Resources in a National Security Zone, 1996
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 233, 234–36 (1997).
288
The complaint named 74 plaintiffs, and the class those plaintiffs represented was estimated at 30,000 residents of the region. Judith Kimerling, Transnational
Operations, Bi-National Justice: ChevronTexaco and Indigenous Huaorani and
Kichwa in the Amazon Rainforest in Ecuador, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 445, 464
(2007).
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chemicals.289 Almost eighteen years later, the litigation is still ongoing, and while description of the entire litigation process would be
overly cumbersome, a number of the decisions and procedural complications are especially significant for future plaintiffs.
The case was initially filed in the Southern District of New York,
and defendant Texaco filed a motion for dismissal for FNC.290 The
district judge noted that this argument for dismissal was particularly
strong, because even though the events may have been initiated at
Texaco headquarters in the United States, “[d]isputes over class membership, determination of . . . damages, and the need for large amounts
of testimony with interpreters, perhaps often in local dialects, would
make effective adjudication in New York problematic at best.”291
The plaintiffs and amici argued that given the state of the Ecuadorean judiciary, a fair trial in Ecuador was unlikely.292 The district
court judge was not persuaded.293 Demonstrating the legal-political
tightrope that federal judges walk when ruling on matters of international consequence, he opined that “impartiality in adjudication is a
potential problem in all jurisdictions including those in the United
States.”294 Realistically, some judicial systems are more advanced
than others: they are better resourced and more independent from other branches of government and therefore better able to freely interpret
the law. But, as the United States becomes increasingly vilified for its
economic and military involvement in other countries,295 projecting
the U.S. legal system abroad by taking cases away from foreign courts
could have negative diplomatic ramifications.296
289

Aguinda I, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718, at *1. Texaco’s oil fields produced more than 3.2 million gallons of toxic waste water daily—”virtually all of
which was dumped into the environment via unlined, open-air…waste pits, without
treatment or monitoring – a practice that has been generally banned in the United
States…since 1979.” Kimerling, supra note 288, at 457. Though little research exists
regarding the long terms effects of exposure to the toxic substances contained in
crude oil (see supra Part I.A), a number of studies have been conducted in Ecuador as
a result of the Aguinda litigation. These studies have noted increased incidence of
several types of cancers in populations affected by the spillage of oil/untreated waste.
See Hurtig & San Sebastian, supra note 35, at 1025; Anna-Karin Hurtig & Miguel
San Sebastian, Incidence of Childhood Leukemia and Oil Exploitation in the Amazon
Basin of Ecuador, 10 INT. J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 245, 247, 249 (2005).
290
Aguinda I, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718, at *4.
291
Id. at *5.
292
Id. at *7.
293
Id.
294
Id.
295
See, e.g. Joseph S. Nye Jr. Soft Power and American Foreign Policy, 119
POL. SCI. Q. 255, 255–56 (2004) (discussing the increase in anti-Americanism abroad
as a result of changes in U.S. foreign policy).
296
See supra notes 235–38 and accompanying text.
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The decision in the initial Aguinda action reflects an attempt by
the district judge to balance the many conflicting political, legal, diplomatic, and practical issues at stake. Though both parties submitted
“a massive amount of material,” the judge was loath to dismiss the
action.297 He ordered further discovery, asked Texaco to convert its
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment,
and strongly encouraged settlement.298 The district judge’s suggestion
of settlement went unheeded, and, in a subsequent proceeding in front
of a different district judge, Texaco won its motion to dismiss for
FNC.299
b.

Round 2 – Ecuador

Had this been a typical case, the Ecuadorean plaintiffs would not
have attempted to re-file the case in their home jurisdiction, having
already expended considerable resources and nine years attempting to
get the case into U.S. federal court.300 Unfortunately for Texaco,301
the lawsuit didn’t just go away. The gravity of harm was so severe,
and the plaintiffs’ lawyers were so motivated, that in May 2003, many
of the Aguinda plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Chevron and Texaco
in a superior court in Lago Agrio, Ecuador.302
297

Aguinda I, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718, at *2.
Id. at *3. The decision heavily encouraged settlement, concluding that
“[t]his dispute is not necessarily best resolved by further litigation” and suggesting
that resolution would be simpler for all parties if the monetary damage claims were
dropped, voluntary corrective measures were taken, and “an impartial person selected” to further assist in mediation. Id. at *31–32.
299
Aguinda v. Texaco, (Aguinda II), 945 F. Supp. 625, 628 (S.D.N.Y 1996),
aff’d, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002). Demonstrative of flaws in the Ecuadorian government at the time, and the uncertainty the plaintiffs faced in being forced to litigate
at home, the Republic of Ecuador supported dismissal in 1994, and 1996. Brief for
The Republic of Ecuador as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants at 1, Aguinda v.
Texaco, 945 F. Supp. 625 (1996) (No. 93-7527), 1994 WL 16188165, at *1. By
2002, however, when the case reached the Second Circuit on appeal, the Republic had
completely changed its position. The Attorney General, Dr. Ramon Jimenez-Carbo
filed an amicus brief on behalf the state for the Aguinda plaintiffs—opposing dismissal to Ecuador for FNC. Brief for The Republic of Ecuador as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 1-2, Aguinda v. Texaco, (Aguinda III), 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.
2002) (Nos. 01-7756-L, 01-7758-Con), 2001 WL 3436915.
300
Kimerling, supra note 288, at 466.
301
Texaco merged with Chevron in 2001, so later references will be to Chevron. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Consent Agreement Allows the Merger
of Chevron Corp. and Texaco Inc., Preserves Market Competition (Sep. 7, 2001),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/09/chevtex.shtm.
302
Kimerling, supra note 288, at 475. The FNC dismissal was very unpopular with Ecuadorian citizens, and led to mass demonstrations at the Attorney General’s office in the capital, Quito. Rogge, supra note 88, at 310. The Ecuadorian
298
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The trial in Ecuador was rife with difficulties and irregularities.303
Despite agreeing to, indeed, fighting for, the jurisdiction of the Ecuadorean courts,304 Chevron continued to voice its displeasure with
the legal action in the American media.305 The ultimate outcome,
however, was a recommendation by the court-appointed Special Master for $27.3 billion in damages for the plaintiffs—a figure that sent
shockwaves through the legal community.306 The damage award was
ultimately reduced to $8.6 billion by the Ecuadorean court.307

iteration of the lawsuit sought “judicial determination of the costs of a comprehensive
environmental remediation – including removal of all pollution that threatens human
health and the environment, restoration of natural resources, and medical monitoring .
. . .” Kimerling, supra note 288, at 476. Because the group of plaintiffs was different
than in the original Aguinda action, they have since been referred to, in both commentary and in further litigation, as the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs (“LAPs”), Chevron Corp. v.
Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 581, 600 (2d Cir. 2011).
303
Initially, the lower court dismissed the action against Chevron, following a
number of ex parte meetings between Chevron’s legal representatives and court officials. Appellate review at the Ecuadorian Supreme Court was delayed while the
country experienced a political and constitutional crisis that closed down the judiciary
for almost a year. Kimerling, supra note 288, at 481.
304
Aguinda III, 303 F.3d 470 at 475. (“Texaco consented to personal jurisdiction in Ecuador as to the Aguinda plaintiffs…[and]…stipulated it would waive its
statute of limitations defenses . . . .”).
305
In 2008, two of the Ecuadorian attorneys leading the lawsuit were awarded
the Goldman Prize, which commends individuals for environmental achievements,
and includes a $150,000 prize for each winner. Chevron publicly criticized the
Goldman Foundation for being “misled,” and called the attorneys “con men.” Tyche
Hendricks, Controversy Mires Choice for Goldman Prize, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON.,
Apr. 15, 2008, at B1; Oil Giant Calls Eco-Award Winners ‘Con Men,’ MSNBC.COM
(Apr.
15,
2008,
10:37
AM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24126664/ns/world_news-world_environment/. The
Goldman Foundation, which has been awarding the prize for 19 years, reiterated its
respect for the selectees, replying that its selection process includes five months of
fact checking, and input from environmental experts at 50 organizations. Hendricks,
supra.
306
Robertson, supra note 284, at 1083. If upheld, the award would have been
“the largest award for environmental damage ever awarded against an oil company.”
Id.
307
Simon Romero & Clifford Krauss, Chevron Is Ordered to Pay $9 Billion
by Ecuador Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2011, at A4. This reduced award is still the
largest in an environmental damage action. Chad Bray, Judge Puts off Chevron Decision,
WALL
ST.
J.,
Feb.
18,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704900004576152421154113438.ht
ml.
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Round 3 – The Return to New York

Clearly unhappy with this outcome, Chevron has returned to the
United States to challenge the judgment’s validity in New York,308
though its position is undercut by its previous argument that Ecuador
was the proper forum for litigation.309 After arguing so strenuously
that Ecuador was the proper forum and that trying the case there was
in the interest of justice, challenging the subsequent outcome constitutes a clear case of “forum shopper’s remorse.”310 Were the facts this
simple, this case would demonstrate a prime example of what Casey
and Ristroph termed “boomerang litigation,” wherein the case returns
to the forum from which it was previously dismissed.311 The result of
boomerang litigation is often dismissal on procedural grounds, rather
than on the merits—leaving the original plaintiffs without opportunity
to recover.312
Non-recognition of foreign judgments is within the discretionary
authority of the U.S. federal courts313—so, unfortunately, it is still

308
Ben Casselman, Chevron Expects to Fight Ecuador Lawsuit in U.S., WALL
ST. J., July 20, 2009, at B3, (“‘We’re not paying and we’re going to fight this for
years if not decades into the future,’ Chevron spokesman Don Campbell said in an
interview.”).
309
Ben Casselman & Chad Bray, Ecuador Seeks to Block Chevron, WALL ST.
J.,
Dec.
5,
2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704342404574575931947490074.ht
ml. While the case was being litigated in U.S. courts, “Chevron submitted fourteen
sworn affidavits attesting to the fairness and adequacy of Ecuador’s courts.” Steven
Donziger, Laura Garr & Aaron Marr Page, Rainforest Chernobyl Revisited: The
Clash of Human Rights and BIT Investor Claims: Chevron’s Abusive Litigation in
Ecuador’s Amazon, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF, 8, 8 (2004).
310
Christopher Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1447
(2011) (quoting Michael D. Goldhaber, Forum Shopper’s Remorse, CORP. COUNS.,
Apr. 2010, at 63).
311
M. Ryan Casey & Barrett Ristroph, Boomerang Litigation: How Convenient is Forum Non Conveniens in Transnational Litigation?, 4 B.Y.U. INT’L L. &
MGMT. REV. 21, 22 (2007).
312
Id. See also Whytock & Robertson, supra note 310, at 1451. The authors
have elaborated on the concept of the boomerang suit, and created the term “transnational access to justice gap,” for the situation where a case is dismissed for FNC, is
decided abroad on the merits, and then boomerangs back to the original forum to
challenge the validity of the foreign judgment. Id. at 1450.
313
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 482 (1987); Unif.
Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act § 4, 13 (U.L.A) (Supp. 2008),
available
at
http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/brand/2005%20NCCUSL%20UFCJRA%20text.pdf [hereinafter UFCMJRA].
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possible for Chevron to avoid liability.314 Under the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (UFCMJRA), which
has been adopted by a majority of states,315 U.S. courts may not recognize judgments “rendered under a judicial system that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law.”316 Paradoxically, the UFCMJRA requires that judges perform precisely the type of analysis they are instructed to avoid when considering FNC motions. In most cases,
however, it would likely be difficult for the moving party to definitively demonstrate that a foreign judicial system failed to provide impartial tribunals.
Such was not the case for Chevron. As the litigation progressed
in Ecuador, the lead attorney for the plaintiffs, Steven Donziger, contacted documentary filmmaker Joseph Berlinger about the case. The
result was a powerful, well-received documentary called Crude.317
The film significantly raised awareness about a lawsuit that was, at the
time, essentially unknown to American audiences. However, that
negative publicity has cut both ways, and Berlinger himself became
embroiled in satellite litigation when Chevron demanded he turn over
more than 500 hours of his unseen footage.318 Berlinger was subsequently ordered to produce the outtakes.319 In these outtakes, Steven
Donziger is filmed saying things such as “‘[t]hey’re all [i.e., the Ecuadorian judges] corrupt! It’s – it’s their birthright to be corrupt.”320
Donziger is also on film discussing plans to humiliate and intimidate
Ecuadorean judges in order to get favorable rulings.321
314

Lucien J. Dhooge, Aguinda v. Chevron-Texaco: Discretionary Grounds
for the Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments for Environmental Injury in the United
States, 28 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 241, 244 (2010).
315
The majority of states have adopted the UFCMJRA, and many of the
remaining states have adopted laws that comport with its standards, or the similar
Restatement position. Heiser, supra note 279, at 634–35.
316
UFCMJRA § 4(b).
317
CRUDE (First Run Features 2009). Critics called Crude a “forceful, often
infuriating story,” and the type of movie Michael Moore would have made if he
“wanted to make a serious movie about capitalism. Manohla Dargis, In the Snows of
Sundance, a Marked Chill in the Air, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/movies/23sund.html?_r=1; John Anderson, Not
Simply an Underdog’s Tale, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2009, at 26. In January 2011,
Berlinger was ordered to turn over the footage. Dave Itzkoff, Documentary Filmmaker Doesn’t Qualify for a Journalist’s Privilege, a Court Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14,
2011, at A15.
318
John Schwartz & Dave Itzkoff, Scenes Cut from Film Find New Role in
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2011, at A13.
319
Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2011).
320
Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp.2d 581, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
321
Id. at 611.
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The footage was subsequently used by Chevron to support its motion against enforcement of the Ecuadorean judgment. Unsurprisingly, admissions of misconduct, and extemporaneous description of the
judicial system as corrupt and partial by the lead plaintiffs’ counsel
bolstered Chevron’s argument for injunction. On March 8, 2011,
Judge Kaplan granted Chevron a preliminary injunction prohibiting
the judgment’s enforcement anywhere except Ecuador.322 Chevron
has no assets in Ecuador.323 The effect of the judgment is to undo
eighteen years of litigation. Citing heavily to the outtakes, Judge
Kaplan found “abundant evidence . . . that Ecuador [had] not provided
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of
law.”324 Ecuador’s Ambassador to the United States was quick to
respond, expressing “consternation that a U.S. court has elected to
pass judgment on Ecuador’s courts.”325 A bizarre legal pretzel thus
emerged, such that eighteen years after the litigation began, the parties
are essentially back at square one—albeit attempting to argue positions opposite to those they took in the original litigation.326 In yet
another twist to the legal pretzel, on September 19, 2011, the Second
Circuit vacated Judge Kaplan’s preliminary injunction in its entirety.327
The Ecuadorean action is a single case with an as-yet uncertain
outcome, and it is therefore of indeterminate precedential value.
However, the events in Ecuador that gave rise to the litigation are
remarkably similar to those that have occurred more than 5,000 miles
away in the Niger Delta. The complicated course the Aguinda action
has charted would likely influence the behavior of defendant oil com322

Id. at 660. Interestingly, Judge Kaplan also ordered the production of the
outtakes in Berlinger. Ben Casselman & Chad Bray, Chevron is Granted Ecuador
Injunction, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2011, at B1.
323
Donziger, 768 F. Supp.2d at 660.
324
Casselman & Bray, supra note 322.
325
Lawrence Hurley, Ecuador’s U.S. Ambassador Speaks Out on Chevron
Case,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Mar.
20,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/03/10/10greenwire-ecuadors-us-ambassadorspeaks-out-on-chevron-c-86771.html.
326
Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 596 (“[I]t is well to bear in mind that the
positions of both sides have changed 180 degrees since the predecessor litigation in
New York. Chevron then touted the adequacy of the Ecuadorian judiciary, while the
plaintiffs—briefs bearing Donziger’s name as counsel—argued that Ecuador could
not provide an adequate forum and that its judiciary was corrupt.”)
327
Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 2011 WL 4375022 at *1 (2d. Cir. 2011). In the
opinion following its September 19 order, the Second Circuit noted that “[t]he story
of the conflict between Chevron and the residents of the Lago Agrio region of the
Ecuadorian Amazon must be among the most extensively told in the history of the
American federal judiciary.” Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir.
2012).

HEALTH MATRIX

584

[Vol. 22: 535]

panies if sued by Nigerian plaintiffs. Chevron has been embroiled in
this single action for more than a decade and a half. A decade and a
half’s worth of litigation costs have been expended, and the corporation may yet be liable for billions of dollars in environmental remediation damages. A decade and a half of bad publicity has harmed Chevron’s public image in an era of increasingly socially-conscious investors.328 While it is hard to predict the impact on future conduct, the
totality of these circumstances might influence Chevron or Exxon to
defend differently against a potential lawsuit by Nigerian plaintiffs.329
Thus, a common law tort lawsuit by Nigerian plaintiffs may very well
be worthwhile.

2.

Common Law Tort Claims Available to Nigerian Plaintiffs
a.

Making the Prima Facie Case

Oil spills in the Niger Delta trigger MNC liability for tortious infliction of personal injury. Though proving intentional infliction of
harm is essentially impossible, poor maintenance of pipelines and
sluggish responses to leaks or blowouts could support a finding of
negligence. A common law claim for events arising in a foreign forum requires application of the law of that forum by the U.S. court.330
Though this can be difficult in certain contexts, both the Nigerian and
American legal systems have the same roots: English Common
328

Socially responsible investing (SRI), generally refers to investment seeking both financial and sustainable development returns. In the past 15 years, investment trends show a 380% increase in investment in socially responsible organizations. SOC. INV. FORUM FOUND., 2010 REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING
TRENDS
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
1
(2010),
available
at
http://ussif.org/resources/research/documents/2010TrendsES.pdf.
See also 60
Minutes: Amazon Crude (CBS News television broadcast May 3, 2009).
329
Chevron has recently launched the Niger Delta Partnership Initiative to
establish “innovative multi-stakeholder partnerships that support programs and activities, which empower communities to achieve a peaceful and enabling environment for
equitable economic growth” in the region. About the Foundation, NIGER DELTA
PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE, http://ndpifoundation.org/about-the-foundation/ (last visited
Aug. 20, 2012). In February 2011, the foundation announced a joint partnership with
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), pledging to invest
$25 million for development in the region in four years. Chevron Foundation,
USAID Give Nigeria $50M, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 17, 2011, 11:24 AM),
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9LEKNG80.htm. While this proactive gesture is commendable, and may yield significant development dividends, it
does not necessarily absolve the corporation of liability for negligent oil spills.
330
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 8, 136 (1965).
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Law.331 Therefore the elements of a tort claim in Nigeria are virtually
identical to those in the United States.332 To prove negligence, the
plaintiff must show that “the defendant owes him a duty of care, that
the duty was breached and that damage resulted from the breach . . .
.”333
Presently, Nigerian plaintiffs are much more likely to recover
from U.S.-based companies in a U.S. federal courtroom than anywhere else. Establishing the first two elements of a prima facie showing of MNC negligence would not be difficult. The Petroleum Act 334
imposes an affirmative duty on foreign oil companies operating in
Nigeria to take precautions against pollution, and to maintain up-todate equipment.335 Negligent maintenance fulfills the second element.
By even a lenient standard, pipelines that have not been replaced or
updated despite continuous use for almost half a century have been
negligently maintained.336
The causation element of a tort case is always the most difficult to
establish.337 Nigerian law requires actual causation,338 and allows for
limitation or elimination of liability when the harm suffered is “too
remote” in relation to the breach.339 This is analogous to the distinction between but-for and proximate causation in American jurisprudence.340 The farther away in time and space the victim is from the
would-be tortfeasor, the less willing the law is to hold the tortfeasor
331
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW at xii (3rd ed.
2005); Jill Cottrell, The Tort of Negligence in Nigeria, 17 J. AFR. L. 30, 30 (1973).
332
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281.
333
FRYNAS, supra note 138, at 190.
334
See supra notes 173–74.
335
See supra text accompanying note 173.
336
See supra text accompanying note 173. In Nigerian courts, oil companies
have typically had the upper hand with respect to the negligence element. The MNCs
have the advantage of technical expertise regarding their own operations because it is
difficult for plaintiffs to provide sufficient scientific expert testimony to counter the
perpetual position of MNCs that they were exercising due care. See FRYNAS, supra
note 138, at 191. This particular advantage would not follow the MNCs home into
the federal court system, however. Experts, while not inexpensive, are not nearly as
difficult to come by in the U.S. See generally MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON ET AL.,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EXPERT TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS: A PRELIMINARY
ANALYSIS
(2000),
available
at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ExpTesti.pdf/$file/ExpTesti.pdf.
337
Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1737
(1985) (“In all of tort law, there is no concept which has been as pervasive and yet
elusive as the causation requirement…”).
338
See FRYNAS, supra note 138, at 190.
339
Cottrell, supra note 331, at 34–35.
340
Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the
Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 467–70 (1980).
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liable.341 For Nigerian plaintiffs in oil spill litigation, actual causation
is fairly clear. But-for the extractive operations of the oil companies,
particularly the snaking of miles of pipeline across the Delta wetlands,
oil spills would not plague the region to the extent that they do.
Establishing proximate causation, in other words, demonstrating
that the harm is not too remote, could be difficult for Nigerian plaintiffs. For the reasons detailed in Part IV.A, particularly pipeline vandalism, MNCs have traditionally enjoyed nearly-automatic exemption
from liability in the small number of actions attempted in Nigerian
courts.342 Sabotage by local militants, the vast majority of whom are
members of disorganized, poorly identified groups, has been pervasive enough that MNCs have always had viable third-party wrongdoers to blame.343 In order to eliminate this liability loophole, a spill
would need to be documented by a legitimate, unbiased source in a
time of relative peace.
b.

Who Makes the Prima Facie Case?

Timing is critical in conflict resolution. The violence in the Niger
Delta has occurred in waves, with a number of pronounced lulls in
recent years.344 Documenting damages during a lull could provide a
viable starting point for a legal action. This would require the involvement of grassroots activists to impart the viability of a potential
lawsuit to Delta residents who are understandably unfamiliar with the
U.S. federal legal system—and the necessity of continued peace for
that lawsuit’s success. A wide variety of international environmental
and human rights organizations are active in the Niger Delta, including Amnesty International,345 Human Rights Watch,346 and Friends of
the Earth International.347 These groups, and others, have already
341

Wright, supra note 337, at 1737. With that time and space, the likelihood
that either the victim or a third party contributed to the loss increases. See id. at
1817–18.
342
See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text.
343
See supra notes 115–20 and accompanying text.
344
See supra Part III.B.4.
345
See PETROLEUM, POLLUTION & POVERTY, supra note 78.
346
See generally Nigeria, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 2010), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/nigeria_0.pdf.
347
Friends of the Earth International is an umbrella environmental network
made up of 5,000 activist groups in seventy-six countries. About Friends of the Earth
International, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH INT’L, http://www.foei.org/en/who-we-are/about
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011). The twofold purposes of Nigeria’s Friends of the Earth
International chapter are: “to act as a peaceful pressure group, campaigning for
change in the policies of governmental, non-governmental and commercial organisations where those policies are likely to act against environmental human rights” and
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documented damage done by oil spills348—and could likely perform
similar roles in the future.
c.

Avoiding the Aguinda Quagmire

Even if Nigerian plaintiffs could establish prima facie negligence
cases, procedural obstacles might still keep their suits out of federal
courts. Aguinda demonstrates how unpredictable an international tort
case of significant magnitude can be—and the multitude of substantive, procedural and financial obstacles plaintiffs must successfully
negotiate in order to have their day in court. But as arduous a road as
it has been, recovery for the plaintiffs is not off the table. And arguably, but-for the video evidence of misconduct by counsel, the judgment enforcement challenge by Chevron would not have gained much
traction. Aguinda will be doubly useful for Nigerian plaintiffs (and
their attorneys), as it demonstrates what to do, and what not to do.
For a region like the Niger Delta that has been trapped in a cyclical crisis for decades, however, a change in tactics would be beneficial. The region’s stakeholders have become entrenched in their traditional positions, apparently preferring to do as they have always done,
even if it means that they get what they’ve always gotten. Pursuing
legal remedies has never been a viable option for Niger Delta residents, for procedural, political, economic, and cultural reasons. But
legal action in the United States is a viable option—a new solution to
an old problem. A successful common law tort claim by a Nigerian
plaintiff would not be a miracle solution to the region’s or country’s
problems; solving those problems demands more than a lawsuit could
ever provide. The law isn’t a business of miracles, it’s a business of
chances. And while the chance to provide “partial relief to some victims is not ideal . . . it is better than providing zero relief to any victims.”349
CONCLUSION
Residents of the Niger Delta have been forced to tolerate toxic
levels of spilled crude oil for decades. Properly extracted by a responsible industry, oil of the quality and quantity available in the Niger Delta could be a blessing. But to the vast majority, it has been
“to enable local people to defend their environmental human rights law.” About ERA,
ENVTL. RIGHTS ACTION/FRIENDS OF THE EARTH: NIGERIA, http://www.eraction.org/
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
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nothing but a curse. Poor governmental control of the oil industry by
faraway bureaucrats has allowed for a staggering level of pollution.
The end—massive wealth for those faraway bureaucrats—has justified the means—negligently irresponsible, if cost-effective, pipeline
maintenance. The result is a region more “battered by oil” than anywhere else on earth.350
Faced with a nearly inconceivable problem, Niger Delta residents
have watched virtually every potential solution go up in smoke.
Though statutes regulating foreign oil companies are in place, they are
only intermittently enforced. The few individuals with the patience,
the funds, and the luck to reach a verdict on the merits in a Nigerian
court have recovered damage awards that are marginal at best. It is
entirely possible that a case against an oil company tried in a courtroom devoid of the myriad difficulties present in a Nigerian courtroom would have a very different outcome from what the typical Nigerian plaintiff has become accustomed to. If the corruption, the procedural delays, the technological inadequacies, and the inconsistencies
regarding standing and joinder are eliminated, the law itself can take
center stage. And the law is biased toward neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant.
A different set of difficulties will present itself to Nigerian plaintiffs—but these difficulties are not insurmountable obstacles. Human
rights groups have attempted to attract attention to the plight of Niger
Delta residents for years, and channeling that attention into concerted
legal action would represent an intelligent adaptation to an everchanging legal environment. The Deepwater Horizon disaster provided American observers with an alarming point of reference: the deluge
of oil unleashed in the Gulf of Mexico is less than half of what Niger
Delta residents have been subjected to. Before the Deepwater Horizon leak had even been capped, BP set aside a claims fund of $20
billion,351 but across the Atlantic, MNCs have fought and evaded liability at every opportunity. This stark double-standard is unacceptable. Regardless of standard operating procedures, “ethical responsibilities of transnational businesses do not end at national borders.”352
Reconciling this double-standard and the decades-old cycle of poverty, pollution, and violence can, and should, occur in the same place:
a United States courtroom.
350
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